The Foreign Service Journal, October 2005

seems to have recognized that Libya’s security is best assured by wary but peaceful relationships with the U.S. and other major gov- ernments, and that Libyan involve- ment with international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction had left the country less safe. He has also recognized that the future is about global economic integra- tion and interaction with private companies representing the best technology and management that Libya’s oil and gas revenues can buy, or attract, for investment. The strategic benefits to the United States of Tripoli’s current posture are immense. Libya is no longer an adversary state located in the Mediterranean basin. Instead, it can be a positive example to the North Koreas and Irans of the world of how to come in from the cold and become a respectable member of the global commu- nity. To put it bluntly, there are too many bad govern- ments seeking dangerous weapons for the U.S. to simply bomb them all into submission. The Bush administration needs an alternative paradigm for international coopera- tion. Détente, including intelligence exchanges on mutu- al terrorist threats, serves the security needs of both states. Assets for Change Domestically, Qadhafi views Western-style political reforms as unnecessary additions to international cooper- ation in foreign policy and economic matters. In the eco- nomic sphere, he appears to have decided to leave oil and gas development and marketing control to the generally apolitical, professionally managed Libyan National Oil Company and the foreign partners it attracts through competitive bidding in a transparent process. American companies benefited from this in the January 2005 round of awards of petroleum exploration con- tracts. But companies from Europe and the Far East have started to give them a run for their money, and bidding in the sum- mer round was brisk. In this area, Libya has already reaped great benefit from improved relations with the U.S. Its oil and gas rev- enues will probably rise signifi- cantly as a result. However, the process of re- building effective state institu- tions and encouraging the private sector to resume busi- ness activity (euphemistically called “expanding the popu- lar sector”) is going very slowly. Libya has not yet passed laws and established mechanisms to implement rational planning, budgeting and other economic reforms for the productive use of the country’s rapidly increasing oil and gas revenues. Moreover, the mostly nontransparent pow- ers of the military, security and intelligence apparatus remain intact. The status of Libyan women represents the single most important change from 1972, when I left Tripoli. After three years there, I had not had an opportunity to meet a single Libyan woman. Their absence from the workplace and isolation in the home had a negative effect on the effi- ciency of the government and productivity of the private sector. Men often left their jobs early to do the family shopping or absented themselves entirely to take a sick child to the doctor. Now, women seem to be everywhere. They made up half of the university audience I addressed, and two of them rose afterwards to ask questions. Those I met in offices and at social occasions were self-confident and assertive. I would hazard a guess that Qadhafi is more popular among Libyan women than among the men, even if he can only take partial responsibility for their emanci- pation. It is hard to assess the actual levels of education and evaluate whether Libyans are being trained in a manner relevant to the country’s needs. But the rapid growth in the numbers of educated Libyans provides manpower for economic and social development. Effective employment of Libya’s human resources, however, depends on the gov- ernment’s adopting sound macro-economic policies and F O C U S 46 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 5 Libya can be a positive example to the North Koreas and Irans of the world of how to come in from the cold and become a respectable member of the global community. Retired FSO David L. Mack is vice president of the Middle East Institute. He served as deputy assistant sec- retary of State for Near Eastern affairs and U.S. ambas- sador to the United Arab Emirates, and also held diplo- matic postings in Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Libya and Tunisia. Assertions and opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.