The Foreign Service Journal, October 2005

by not waiting to proceed. Libya now enjoys full diplo- matic relations with virtually every major government except for the United States. This is mostly symbolic — after all, we can have relations with other states, such as Syria, without those relations being very satisfy- ing to either side. But symbol- ism is all-important to Qadhafi, who did not embark upon the dramatic changes in his for- eign policy to be spurned as not respectable enough to have a U.S. ambassador in Tripoli who would deliver the occasional letter from the president. This is especially the case given that other states, including the U.K., have even engaged in summitry with Qadhafi. Libyans are becoming nervous that the U.S., having received a generous settlement for the Pan Am 103 families and a huge intelligence and security windfall resulting from Libya’s surrender of WMD materials and documents, is now prepared to let relations stall at the present level of liaison offices with limited functions. At some point, this would probably result in Libyan retaliation of some kind, and several of my interlocutors hinted at that in vague terms. President Bush’s second inaugural address, with its emphasis on the need for democracy as a basis for our relations with other states, together with Washington’s enthusiasm about the “Arab spring,” has set off alarm bells in Tripoli. To the Libyans, this looks like we are simply raising the bar higher for development of normal rela- tions. I encountered hostile questions from the universi- ty audience in addition to the more predictable queries from senior Libyan officials. Quoting an Arab proverb, one senior official said, “Enter the house of a friend by its front door, not through the window.” If we discuss inter- nal political reforms, he said, we should do it on the offi- cial level. If a U.S. embassy in any Arab country goes behind the back of the government, or if we send NGOs into the country for this purpose, it will be viewed with great suspicion by the people of that country — not just the regime. Suggested U.S. Initiatives Libya’s policy shift, even with its shortcomings, has been a dramatic success both for Libya and for its former adversaries in Europe and the United States. The strategic gains, as well as the benefits for business are nearly self-evident. At this point, however, an Iranian strategist or the ambi- tious political leader of another government considering how to mend bad relations with Wash- ington would probably conclude that the U.S. was not honoring its understandings with Libya. Less obvious, but perhaps more important in the longer term, is the potential for Libyan citizens to gain economic and political reforms as the result of the country’s new openness to the global community. Neglect of the budding bilateral relationship would risk both short-term and long-term strategic gains. There are steps that Libya should initiate itself, but let me focus on moves the Bush administration should make: • Establish a target date for beginning visa issuance in Tripoli. Inform the Libyan government of the date, but say that implementation depends on meeting practical requirements connected with the security of our facility. We should offer to announce that date publicly, so the Libyans have cover to begin visa issuance in Washington. • Assure the Libyans that we are reviewing their listing as a state sponsor of terrorism with an open mind and are not subjecting them to shifting standards. In the mean- time, tell them we intend to proceed with the normaliza- tion process to the extent that is consistent with U.S. legal requirements. • Formulate proposals for dialogue between Libyan and U.S. entities about the process of economic and polit- ical reform. It must be made clear that we are prepared to listen with an open mind to what they have to say about The Green Book and Libya’s political system, known as Jamahiriyah. (This is a form of participatory democracy based on town-meeting-style gatherings called people’s congresses, held at local, regional and national levels.) • Endorse the establishment of private-sector business groups in both the U.S. and Libya to present the concerns of our respective business communities to the govern- ments in each capital. • Send a high-level visitor to Tripoli to convey these points to the Libyans. Public statements made about Libya should be neither unduly fulsome nor insensitive to their national pride. n F O C U S 48 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 5 Both Libya and the U.S. have gained strategically from the détente in their relations, but more forward movement is needed to prevent a relapse.