The Foreign Service Journal, October 2005

night-vision equipment or even assent to British assistance to Syria. Over and above that, Washington stood in the way of joint Syrian- Iraqi patrols along the common border. In fact, Damascus is still waiting for an official Iraqi security team to initial that agreement. Miscalculations Such tactics indicate that Wash- ington is lashing out in frustration, at least partially because it does not understand what makes Damascus tick. By virtue of its history, specifically its leading role in the Arab national revolt during World War I, Syria sees itself as the champion of Arab rights — an ideational constraint that limits the external action of any regime that dominates Syria. Accordingly, to retain its legitimacy any Syrian government is expected to defend Arabs, whether in Syria, Palestine or anywhere else in the region. Thus, by ostracizing Damascus, Washington is open- ing itself up to unintended consequences. First, the lit- tle popularity that the U.S. enjoys in the Arab world is diminishing. Indeed, the perception on the “Arab street” — that the U.S., in cahoots with Israel, has occupied one Arab country and is targeting another — runs directly counter to American efforts to win Arab hearts and minds. Second, U.S. pressure is forcing Assad to limit the domestic reforms he set out to implement. Indeed, the message of the Tenth Baath Party Congress that was held in June is one of defiance to both civil society and to the U.S. Finally, Washington’s persistence in its aggressive policy vis-a-vis Damascus might cause the Assad regime to implode. This might not be such a bad thing, were it not for the fact that (other than the ruling Baath Party) the Muslim Brotherhood — an Islamist political party that has been operating in Syria since the 1940s — is the largest and most organized political force in the country. Although some in Washington like to think that this is just the kind of disinformation that the Syrian government propagates to deter Washington from attempting to destabilize or even oust it, the real- ity on the ground speaks for itself: political Islam is con- tinually gaining in strength in Syria, helped along by American miscalculations. A Win-Win Scenario This situation is unfortunate, for Washington and Damascus need each other to attain larger objectives. Syria needs America’s influence with Israel to recover its Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Washington needs Syrian cooper- ation to control the border with Iraq to put pressure on the insurgency there. Beyond that, Damascus’ staunchly secular government can help the U.S. check the rise of political Islam in the region. Most broadly, Washington needs Syrian support to combat terrorism. Although this last point may, from Washington’s perspective, seem a stretch in light of the country’s long presence on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, it is not a contradiction in Syrian eyes. Whereas Damascus views militant Palestinian anti-Israel organizations as national libera- tion movements struggling to end Israel’s occupation of Arab lands, it sees al-Qaida as a terrorist organiza- tion that has murdered thousands of innocent civilians. To emphasize that distinction, Syria has been a valuable ally in the fight against al-Qaida. Consider the revelation that three years ago, Syrian security ser- vices tipped off the CIA to an impending al-Qaida attack against the administrative unit of the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. If successful, the operation would have killed a large number of American troops, according to Richard W. Erdman, a State Department specialist for Syria speaking at an American Israel Public Affairs Committee meeting in Washington. In addition, Syria provided information to the CIA on Mohammed Atta, the leader of the Hamburg cell who had lived in Aleppo during the early 1990s, and Marwan Derkazenli, the financial conduit to al-Qaida, enabling the CIA to break up the Hamburg cell and other al-Qaida entities in Europe. Syria also helped save American and Canadian lives when its security services tipped off Canadian authorities of an impend- ing attack against American institutions there. Indeed, American and Syrian agendas are not mutu- ally exclusive. Washington could obtain Syria’s coop- eration on securing its border with Iraq, as well as controlling Hamas and Hezbollah (particularly in F O C U S O C T O B E R 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 51 There have long been tensions in the U.S.-Syrian relationship, of course, which the Iraq War has exacerbated.