The Foreign Service Journal, October 2006

communicative, democratizing world, successful foreign policy cannot be made in secret by a tight group of trusted confidants. In sta- ble democracies and even in auto- cratic situations, support for (or opposition to) a government’s for- eign policy comes frommany direc- tions: the media, educational estab- lishments, opposition parties, other parts of the bureaucracy, the busi- ness community, labor unions, NGOs, students and religious lead- ers. To ensure support when we need it, the U.S. must be laying the groundwork for a whole range of contingencies day in, day out, through public diplomacy. During the Cold War, the U.S. worked hard to con- vince friends and allies of our shared political and moral compass. Even in London and Paris there were well-staffed PD missions. USIA was continually updat- ing computers and communications technology to back up the fast-reacting, intricately coordinated, highly spe- cialized and professionally skilled person-to-person efforts of America’s public diplomacy corps. Until very recently these officers proudly accepted (and were allowed to accept) the risk of operating out of buildings that weren’t fortresses for the frightened. America’s PD efforts emanated from cultural centers, libraries and English-teaching institutes where people were warmly welcomed to share the excitement of an open society. USIA librarians served high school and college kids, which is to say future as well as current leaders: leg- islators, presidential aides, journalists, academics, busi- nesspeople. Educational and professional exchange pro- grams gave people from around the world firsthand expe- rience of the U.S. With very rare exceptions, they returned with a keen appreciation for Americans and their institutions. Similar exchange programs made it possible for Americans to learn about the world. U.S. teenagers studied in German high schools and lived with German families. Fulbright professors taught American studies to Russians, even during the Cold War. Many foreign area and language specialists who later joined USIA or the State Department began their international careers as Fulbright researchers in Japan, India, Brazil, you name it. Profoundly experienced in the cultural con- text of the countries to which they would eventually be posted, they were able to shape America’s mes- sage in ways that resonated with radically different audiences. Today many exchange programs are underfunded and, for political and budgetary reasons, aimed largely at one geographic region. Further, by de-emphasizing the need to educate Americans abroad in favor of bringing foreigners here, the State Department has forgotten that the very meaning of “exchange” is two -way. Similarly, USIA’s press and information experts played a dual role. They kept accurate and relevant information on current U.S. policy flowing to foreign opinion-shapers, policymakers and media people who, however well disposed toward the West, might be unin- formed or susceptible to misinformation and disinfor- mation. The Voice of America was a trusted daily source of reliable news, admired for its accuracy and because it occasionally aired news items that were not wholly favorable to the U.S., thus incarnating the virtues of a free press. In addition to supporting systematic polling efforts to keep tabs on public opinion, information officers monitored the local press for anti-American stories, editorials and commentaries, then crafted culturally- appropriate, rapid, on-the-spot responses that got a thoughtful reception because these PD pros had been making friends and doing their homework all along. USIA officers didn’t put out vicious propaganda, didn’t conceal authorship, didn’t manipulate, didn’t lie. The truth usually made America look good — but the way USIA handled PD made America look even better. The Bush administration might have garnered stronger support for its foreign policy if the public diplomacy resources developed over decades hadn’t been squandered and the very need for a PD profes- sion hadn’t been so radically disputed. Uncritical devo- tion to the market model and to the private sector led to filling PD leadership positions with advertising and public relations executives whose miscalculations resulted in ridicule. Their ineptness, in turn, encouraged the Pentagon to fill the information gap in ways that have under- F O C U S 30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 6 Effective PD programs do not presume that the U.S. can democratize tyrannized societies overnight, or is the only model for them.