The Foreign Service Journal, October 2006

might be just like a tune played by the Titanic ’s dance band. Steve Flora FS Information Program Officer Consulate Dubai, UAE Fuzzy Intelligence Intelligence is always based on imperfect knowledge and the judg- ment of analysts — in effect, reading straws in the wind. Your June Cyber- notes article, “Intelligence Estimates: Fuzzy Math?” reminds me of another time when the Bureau of Intelligence and Research clearly outshone the competition. Back in 1973, when I was deputy director of the Office of Economic Research and Analysis, our team pro- duced a report cautioning that the Arab oil producers were moving toward the creation of an oil cartel. As a result, the U.S. might expect an oil embargo within the next few months as a tool for raising oil prices signifi- cantly, thus enriching the coffers of the oil-producing countries. Exerci- sing his “discretion,” the assistant sec- retary for INR refused to approve the paper for distribution because he regarded it as “alarmist,” declaring that “any economist knows that cartels don’t work.” Three weeks later came the public announcement from OPEC and long lines at gas stations across the country. I immediately got a call from the assis- tant secretary asking if I still had the paper. We were the first agency in government to come out with an analysis of the probable effects of OPEC and the cost to the American economy. I’ve always wondered whether being first in the field with an accurate prediction would have made any difference. Intelligence is always imperfect. And I wonder whether more accurate information from the CIA would have been any more believed than its misplaced confi- dence that Iraq actually had weapons of mass destruction, not merely the technology to produce them. But the real problemwith regard to Saddam Hussein was that he was engaged in a deliberate attempt to convince his neighbors (and the world), as a means of intimidation, that he was actually developing WMDs. That prompted us to take pre-emptive measures to protect ourselves. Like any bluffing poker player, he paid the price for bluffing. So let’s quit blaming President Bush for doing what was necessary to protect the U.S. The residual problem is that our action has, like the boy crying wolf, effectively disarmed us in calling on the world to take measures to confront Iran and North Korea’s efforts to, as you also noted, develop WMDs. Based on my experience working with DIA and CIA officers, I think Washington Post commentator David Ignatius’ assessment that INR is the best of the pack, as you also noted, is right on target. I have fond memories of my two years in INR and the col- leagues I worked with. It is an exam- ple of how an assignment often dis- dained by regular FSOs can prove highly rewarding, even career-enhanc- ing. David Timmins FSO, retired Professor of Economics, Brigham Young University Salt Lake City, Utah Notes for the Secretary I would like to share with FSJ read- ers my view of the significance of the Secretary of State’s responsibilities. My conception of the job is that the Secretary of State holds the most important position in the U.S. Cabin- et. He (or she) is not only the presi- dent’s supreme adviser on foreign relations, but also CEO of an organi- 8 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 6 L E T T E R S