The Foreign Service Journal, October 2007

return for peace. Because of these fundamentally divergent philosophies, the Labor-Likud coalition governments bet- ween 1984 and 1990 engaged in frequent disputes over the fate of The Territories. During the Oslo years, the Likud government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu surrendered a small part of The Territories to the PA, while the Labor governments of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak ceded larger sections. All Israeli governments built settlements in The Territories during the pre-Oslo period, but pursued different strategies. The Labor governments focused on areas far fromPalestinian population centers, while the Likud governments scattered settlements over the entirety of The Territories. During the Oslo process, both the Labor and Likud gov- ernments brought more settlers to The Territories, more than doubling their number during this period. The Rabin gov- ernment considered the possibility of discussing the future of The Territories and evacuating settlements before the final- status treaty, but decided against it. The Netanyahu govern- ment pledged to keep the settlements in place in any final-sta- tus setup. The Barak government appeared ready to evacu- ate many settlements as part of a comprehensive agreement, but bowing to settler demands and right-wing pressure it, too, expanded the Israeli presence in The Territories. Since the collapse of the Oslo process, Israel has essential- ly rejected all the conflict-resolution plans that have required it to freeze settlement expansion or return to the 1967 line. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s government rejected Pres. Clinton’s proposal, which would have required Israel to remove settlements from almost all of The Territories. Sharon first sought to sign a long-term interim treaty with the Palestinians, but in 2003 began shifting to a plan, dubbed “dis- engagement,” allowing Israel to craft the elements of a grad- ual pullout from The Territories to a line of its own choosing. Toward that end, the Sharon government evacuated the Gaza Strip in August 2005. Sharon’s successor, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, pledged in early 2006 to evacuate most of the West Bank, dubbing it “convergence,” but the plan has all but disappeared. In the meantime, Israel has expanded settlements, and settlers built unauthorized outposts, reportedly assisted by branches of the government. These activities have been going on for years. The Palestinian Balance Sheet Unlike the fluctuating Israeli position, the Palestinian stance has evolved in a linear fashion. Until the 1970s, the PLO sought to drive the Jews from Palestine, but in the early 1970s, it began calling for a binational, Israeli-Palestinian state in all of Palestine. Later in that decade, the PLO seemed ready to recognize Israel, in return for recognition of the Palestinians’ right to a state. In 1977, the PLO essentially accepted President Carter’s Geneva Plan and United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, amended to mention Palestinian statehood. By the 1980s, facing growing indication that the U.S. and many in Israel, particularly within Labor, were seeking to solve the conflict by linking a Palestinian entity in The Territories to Jordan, the PLO leaned toward forming a con- federation with Amman. However, Likud and its partners rejected that approach, the so-called Jordanian Option, tor- pedoing the Reagan Plan and its derivatives, the Hussein- Arafat Accord and the London Agreement, negotiated by Israeli Foreign Minister Peres and Jordan’s King Hussein. By the late 1980s, the PLO came to accept putting an end to the conflict based on an Israeli return to the 1967 line and the formation of a Palestinian state in The Territories beside Israel — either in a confederation with Jordan, as mentioned above, or as a standalone entity, as called for by the Saudi Plan of 1981. Affirming this change of stance in 1988 the PLO rec- ognized Israel and declared its intention to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner. Since then, the Palestinians have essen- tially accepted all the plans put forward to resolve the conflict, except Israeli Prime Minister Shamir’s Plan (1989), which did not recognize the PLO and insisted on continued Israeli con- trol of The Territories. In 1989, the PLO accepted the Baker Plan, and in 1991 it sent representatives to the Madrid conference. The Palestin- ians then embarked on the Oslo process with Israel. Within this framework, the PLO/PA signed five major interim treaties with Israel — the Oslo I and Oslo II Accords, the Hebron Protocol, and the Wye River and Sharm El Sheikh Memorandums — assuming this would lead to evacuation of the settlements and formation of a Palestinian state in all of The Territories. However, Israel refused even to discuss these issues before the final-status talks and, instead, expand- ed the settlements. Soon Palestinian self-rule in the areas sur- rendered by Israel essentially turned into governance subject to Israeli consent. By the 1990s, Palestinian dissatisfaction mounted and con- flict intensified, sparking frequent Israeli collective punish- ments, which only inflamed the situation. Still, the PA con- tinued to accept the Oslo outline, despite growing indications that Israel did not intend to fully relinquish The Territories. With the failure of the Camp David Summit in July 2000, tensions mounted in The Territories and eventually exploded on Sept. 28, 2000, leading to a Palestinian revolt against Israel. Nevertheless, the PA continued talks with Israel, and progress was made by early 2001; but most Israelis rejected this process, electing Ariel Sharon as prime minister. The PA has accepted the attempts to stop the fighting based on a bilateral, Israeli-Palestinian effort, including the O C T O B E R 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 57