The Foreign Service Journal, October 2007

OC T OB E R 2 0 0 7 / F OR E I GN S E R V I C E J OU R N A L 71 of service, the highest-rated 35 to 40 per- cent are assigned to the nine-month Army War College course (most via res- ident instruction, while some take the equivalent distance-education course). While those courses include trainingon technical and tactical topics, they also edu- cate officers on non-military-specific top- ics suchasmanagement, human resources, planning, organizational behavior, critical thinking and interagency coordination. All officerswishing tobepromotedmust com- plete these courses. Given the Army’s career-long com- mitment to classroom training and pro- fessional education, the only real point of similarity between Foreign Service and Army officer training is at swearing-in. NewArmy officers receive 12 to 20weeks of orientationand functional trainingwhile new Foreign Service members typically receive 13 to 17 weeks (typically, the “A- 100” course plus consular training). There the similarities between the ForeignService andArmy approach toward educationand training end. It is true that most Foreign Service members receive from6months to 3 years of assignment-specific foreign-language training during their careers—something that fewArmy officers receive. However, most Army officers spend a similar amount of time in on-the-job operational training, suchasweapons practice and field maneuvers. Trying to Close the Gap No one has spoken more eloquently about the need for expanded training for Foreign Servicemembers thandid former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. As a retired Army officer himself, Sec. Powell explained that “inmy 35 years, almost 36 years of service, I was in school for close to six years — an enormous investment on thepart of theArmy ingettingme ready forwhatever came.” He contrastedhismil- itary schooling to that of a typical Senior Foreign Service member, who might have received only a fewmonths of non- language training during a 30-year career. During his tenure at State, Sec. Powell launched several initiatives to begin to reduce that disparity. For example, withAFSA’s strong sup- port, he established the requirement to complete leadership and management training tobe eligible for promotion. That marked a culture change for Foreign Service members, who often avoided any training (except for foreign-language instruction) due to the perception that it would slow their promotions by taking them away from their day-to-day duties. The resulting four new FSI leadership courses are highly regarded. However, added together, they total just threeweeks of instruction prior to promotion to the Senior Foreign Service—compared to 30 months of midcareer schooling that the average Army officer receives. He also sought funding to create a “training float” — such as the U.S. mili- tary services have — equivalent to 10 to 15 percent of the staffing level required to fill existing overseas and domestic jobs. Onlywith such “bench strength” could the Department of State significantly expand long-term language and functional train- ing without leaving hundreds of regular positions vacant worldwide. Unfortu- nately, while Sec. Powell did secure some funding for additional training positions, the creation of a large training float was abandonedonce all availablepositionswere shifted to Iraq. The net result is that, despite important initiatives in the last decade that afforded America’s diplomats more training than ever before, most Foreign Service mem- bers still receive far less professional train- ing than does the average U.S. Army offi- cer. Militarizing U.S. Foreign Policy What is the impact onU.S. foreignpol- icy of this relative underinvestment in Foreign Service training? This question is difficult toanswer because several other fac- tors are simultaneously at work, including shortfalls in Foreign Service staffing levels and underinvestment in foreign affairs agency program budgets. Looking at the net impact of all of the shortchangingof diplomacy, theDecember 2006 report “Embassies asCommandPosts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” issued by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committeeunder then-ChairmanRichard G. Lugar, R-Ind., found that “The current 12:1 ratio of military spending to spend- ing on the diplomatic and civilian foreign aidagencies risks the further encroachment of themilitary, by default, into areaswhere civilian leadership is more appropriate.” The report quotedoneU.S. ambassador who noted that “the military has signifi- cantly more money and personnel and is so energetic in pursuing its newly created programs and in thinking up new ones, that maintaining amanagement hand on military activities is increasingly diffi- cult.” The report went on to warn that “U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceivedgaps [indiplomacy, international information programming, and foreign assistance]. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda forU.S. relationswith foreigncoun- tries.” As the Senate report indicates, the result of skimping on diplomatic readiness while building up military muscle is that the highly-trained and well-resourced members of the U.S. armed forces are increasingly taking on tasks once rightful- ly assigned todiplomats. That is not a crit- icismof America’s can-domilitary, which is only stepping into a partial vacuum to get the job done. However, if left unchecked, this trend could erode the Department of State’s role as the lead for- eign affairs agency and reduce our nation’s options when responding to foreign chal- lenges. As the old saying goes, “If the only tool you have is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail.” Even former Speaker of the House of RepresentativesNewtGingrich, a past crit- ic of the State Department and current member of the Pentagon’sDefense Policy Board, now argues that too many tasks havedevolved to themilitary and that a sig- A F S A N E W S