The Foreign Service Journal, October 2008

O C T O B E R 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 5 Earlier this year, the Foreign Service Journal polled readers, asking for suggestions on new topics to be covered. One re- sponse, in particular, caught my attention: “How many senior officers have sold their souls to the devil over Iraq to advance their careers?” It is indeed true that, until now, that issue has not been addressed in this journal. However, the same question, as applied to senior military officers, has been the subject of vigorous discussion in professional military publications over the past few years. For example, the Armed Forces Journal (“the leading joint service monthly magazine”) has published numerous articles examining whether America’s senior military offi- cers have fulfilled their duty to offer professional advice to their politically- appointed civilian superiors, especially concerning initial operations in Iraq: • In April 2007, active-duty Lieu- tenant Colonel Paul Yingling wrote that “generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabili- ties.” He charged that, as a group, U.S. generals had chosen conformity and career advancement over providing their frank, expert views. • In July 2007, active-duty Lieu- tenant Colonel John Mauk argued that “the failure of our generals in Iraq was a failure to stand up to the defense sec- retary, the administration and their appointed leader in Iraq.” • In August 2007, active- duty Colonel Henry J. Fores- man Jr. cited “the failure of the senior uniformed ranks to serve as a responsible check and balance to manifold civilian strate- gic shortcomings—often hiding behind the principle of political neutrality to disguise cowardice and careerism.” • In February 2008, retired Lieu- tenant General John H. Cushman called for an investigation of prewar planning to determine if “U.S. four- stars ... [had] forcefully made known their objections to the defense secre- tary and, if necessary, to the president.” The unifying theme of these essays is that, due to timidity or careerism, some senior U.S. military professionals failed to provide their political superi- ors with potentially unwelcome expert assessments. Is the military alone in having senior officers who have failed to stand up for their services, or can the same be said of some of our nation’s senior career diplomats? To answer these questions, we need to put the issue in context. By law and tradition, the American system of government makes a clear distinction between politically appoint- ed and career officials. Political ap- pointees come and go with the elec- toral tides. They are not selected because they are, by some objective measure, the best prepared person for the job, but rather because they helped the new president get elected and share his worldview. Career officials, on the other hand, rise through gov- ernment ranks based on documented performance and demonstrated poten- tial. They then use their years of expe- rience to provide frank, nonpartisan advice to political appointees whose job it is to make the final decision. What is not supposed to happen is for career officials to abandon their apolitical orientation by allying them- selves with a politically appointed patron in order to obtain a plum posi- tion ahead of their peers. Career offi- cials are not supposed to be compliant yes-men and yes-women who fail to meet their professional responsibility to speak up, behind closed doors, about likely negative consequences of pending policy decisions. Have these things taken place in recent years at the State Department? Have some senior career officials “sold their souls” over Iraq and other issues in order to advance their careers? I believe that some have. I also believe that it is appropriate for active-duty diplomats, like our uniformed col- leagues, to openly discuss this impor- tant professional issue. I will do so in my November col- umn — not by looking backward at the historical details of Iraq policy formula- tion, but rather by looking forward at broader issues of enduring importance: What are the professional responsibili- ties of senior career officials? What should happen to those who fail to ful- fill those responsibilities? n P RESIDENT ’ S V IEWS A Professional Issue B Y J OHN K. N ALAND John K. Naland is the president of the American Foreign Service Association.