The Foreign Service Journal, October 2008

present the regime with a clear choice: if you take significant steps toward democracy, beginning with the freeing of all political prisoners, we will take steps to begin normalizing relations. That’s the way to bring about real change in Cuba — through strong, smart and principled diplomacy.” Fidel Castro responded sharply to Obama’s proposals, as he has to any notion that Cuba’s form of govern- ment should be influenced by a for- eign power. Obama’s speech, Castro said, “can be translated as a formula for hunger for the country.” He thus reinforced the idea that food shortages are the fault of U.S. policy and not any shortcomings in Cuba’s system. (Ana- lysts point out that it is difficult to blame the United States for empty cupboards in Cuba because U.S. food exports to the island have been legal since 2000.) As a young revolutionary, Castro saw vast potential for the island to be self-sufficient in food. Cuba “could easily provide for a population three times as great as it has now. … The markets should be overflowing with produce; pantries should be full.” The U.S. Embargo Before 1960, the two economies had been exceptionally close: Cuba was a main source of agricultural prod- ucts, mostly sugar, for the United States, which, in turn, provided the bulk of Cuba’s manufactured goods and tourists. But in October 1960, two weeks before the U.S. presidential election, the Eisenhower administra- tion imposed a partial embargo. The action followed sweeping nationaliza- tions, without compensation, by Cuba of American properties (5,911 by U.S. government count), and signs of grow- ing Soviet friendship with Havana. Washington broke diplomatic rela- tions in January 1961, and President John F. Kennedy expanded the em- bargo in 1962 to ban all trade ex- cept for non-subsidized humanitarian items. It was further tightened over the years, sometimes by executive order and sometimes by Congress, as was the case in 1992 and 1996. Of the 10 U.S. presidents who have served since Castro’s rise to power, Jimmy Carter showed the most inter- est in reaching an accommodation with the island. He lifted restrictions on travel to Cuba in 1977 and author- ized political discussions with Cuban representatives. Interest sections — diplomatic missions below the embas- sy level — were opened in Washing- ton and Havana. But progress toward normal relations under Carter foun- dered because of the growing number of Cuban troops in Africa. It was during the Carter era that Castro suffered one of his biggest set- backs. The departure in 1980 of more than 125,000 Cubans on boats to Florida (the Mariel boat lift) offered clear evidence of widespread disaffec- tion among Castro’s subjects. One inspiration for the exodus was the vis- its to the island during the Carter years by numerous Cuban-Americans, who told friends and relatives about the good economic situation in America. By itself, the imposition of a social- ist economy was disruptive. Toss the U.S. embargo into the mix, and the result, at least in the early years, was catastrophic. In his book Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution , Louis A. Perez describes the ensuing economic chaos: “By the early 1960s, conditions in many industries had become critical due to the lack of replacement parts. Virtually all industrial structures were dependent on supplies and parts now denied to Cuba. Many plants were paralyzed. Havoc followed. Transpor- tation was especially hard hit: the min- istry was reporting more than 7,000 breakdowns a month. Nearly one- quarter of all buses were inoperable by the end of 1961. One half of the 1,400 passenger rail cars were out of service in 1962. Almost three quarters of the Caterpillar tractors stood idle due to a lack of replacement parts.” The international political context of the period helps explain the vigor- ous U.S. response to Castro. Com- munist regimes had been cropping up in Eastern Europe and Asia after World War II, often under Soviet tute- lage. To Washington, the idea of a pro-Soviet, communist regime on America’s doorstep was unthinkable. And the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 confirmed Washing- ton’s worst fears. On these and other issues, Castro showed immense audacity in thinking he could handle Washington’s wrath toward him. Political will, an efficient block-by-block surveillance network and an American penchant for mis- takes helped him ride out the storm. Of these miscalculations, the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion was easily the most egregious. Castro survived that and other early American at- tempts to oust him, which included assassination plots and incendiary bombs targeted at key installations. The embargo remains Washing- ton’s main anti-Castro instrument. Another is radio and TV broadcasts, neither of which have much of an audience, thanks to jamming. Allud- ing to the absence of viewers, TV Marti is derided in the Cuban media as “TV Invisible.” Will the Status Quo Hold Firm? No one could have foreseen in 1961 that the embargo, not to mention the Castro dynasty itself, would still be in place after almost 50 years, long after the Cold War ended. To be sure, there have been some changes around the edges. In 2000, Congress allowed food sales to Cuba for the first time, reflecting demands by U.S. farmers for more export opportunities. Leading the charge for this exception to the embargo were representatives from farm states, both Republicans O C T O B E R 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 57