The Foreign Service Journal, October 2010

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 0 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 13 was the same thing as diplomacy. This left him open to criticism that such an approach was naive. Indeed, Nicolson might say that a challenge for diplomatic professionals is the temptation to view diplomacy as somehow synonymous with engage- ment. In fact, leaders and practitioners alike need to be clear that engagement is only one element of diplomacy. While engagement is important, diplo- macy is about more than talking to America’s adversaries. In addition, though it does not produce results overnight, diplomacy lays the ground- work for success in the long run — at least when strategically conceived and properly executed. In more recent statements the pres- ident has been clearer about this key distinction. For example, in a com- mencement speech at West Point in May, he declared that: “Engagement is not an end in itself.” U.S. relations with Russia and Iran are two examples of the need to think clearly about the distinction between engagement and diplomacy. Some observers criticized President Obama’s pledge to reach out to Tehran in the early months of his administra- tion. They cited Iranian declarations that it would build even more nuclear enrichment plants, deny or delay ac- cess to IAEA inspectors, and enrich fuel to higher percentages as evidence of the policy’s failure. In fact, offers of American engage- ment at that time helped expose fis- sures inside the Tehran regime and between the regime and the Iranian people. Moreover, talks with Tehran last fall produced a modest nuclear deal that hardliners then rejected. Pres. Obama used this backsliding as part of a larger diplomatic strategy to rally the international community to get tougher with Iran. In November 2009, Russia and China voted with the United States in favor of an Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency resolu- tion demanding that Iran freeze operations at its once-secret nuclear enrichment plant. And in May 2010 they supported tough United Nations Security Council sanctions on Iran, de- spite a Turkish and Brazilian effort to head it off. Engagement with Iran is now only a part (and perhaps likely to be a shrink- ing part) of a broader U.S. diplomatic strategy to end Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The Obama administration can continue a policy of engagement to strengthen those in Tehran who want a diplomatic solution while simultane- ously pursuing international support for even tighter sanctions. But in doing so, it should engage not only the regime, but the people of Iran, includ- ing the pro-democracy movement. Toward that end, senior U.S. officials should speak out in defense of those championing freedom and human rights. Washington should also sound out Tehran’s neighbors on creating multi- lateral structures to dissuade Iran from pursuing its nuclear ambitions. For ex- ample, the U.S. could propose joint military exercises between NATO and the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Relations with Russia have followed a similar course. Although the Obama administration has been heavily criti- cized for pressing the “reset button” in U.S.-Russian relations, the policy has already yielded tangible results. As he engaged the Kremlin, the president changed direction on missile defenses in Central Europe, abandoning missile and radar sites in Poland and the Czech Republic to whichMoscow had objected. This shift helps explain Rus- sia’s IAEA and U.N. votes against Iran. Although serious differences with Russia remain, engagement became part of a plan that has also led to the New START arms control treaty await- ing Senate ratification. To make fur- ther progress in this area, the admini- stration can now leverage its strategic arms dialogue with Moscow to bring together Russia, China, India, Japan and the NATO allies in support of a joint missile defense effort to protect our peoples from the threat of state or non-state extremists armed with ballis- tic missiles and weapons of mass de- struction. The Modern Diplomat Nicholson says in his book that the type of people we choose to be diplo- mats is important. This will surely be proven true as the administration seeks to realize the goals in the National Se- curity Strategy. In concluding a chap- ter on “The Ideal Diplomat,” Nichol- son describes the qualities such pro- fessionals possess as “truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good humor, modesty and loyalty.” He continues: “But the reader may object, you have forgotten intelligence, knowledge, discernment, S P E A K I N G O U T We must resist the temptation to view diplomacy as synonymous with engagement.