The Foreign Service Journal, October 2011

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 1 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 17 ruption and instability, conditions favor- able to the Taliban. Meanwhile, Embassy Islamabad is undergoing a billion-dollar expansion of its own, notwithstanding the fact that the size of the official American pres- ence in Pakistan — 3,555 visas were is- sued to U.S. diplomats, military officials and employees of “allied agencies” in 2010 alone—has already fueled popu- lar suspicion there. This was com- pounded when U.S. “diplomat” Ray- mond Davis, who turned out to be a CIA contractor, killed two Pakistani na- tionals earlier this year. Carrying $14 trillion in debt and an- nual budget deficits in excess of $1 tril- lion, we cannot afford the whole-of- government, resource-intensive ap- proaches used in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Fortunately, a leaner, more streamlined approach to diplomacy and development will not only work, but work more effectively. A Better Model for the 21st Century In 1981, President Ronald Reagan was determined to thwart the expan- sion of communism in El Salvador, in spite of a deeply skeptical Congress still mindful of the Vietnam War. To win funding fromCongress, Reagan agreed to limit military advisers to the El Sal- vador Armed Forces to just 55 person- nel in country at any time. This military group could train and advise, but was strictly forbidden from engaging in combat or accompanying trainees in field operations. USAID was infor- mally limited to 36 FSOs and about an equal number of expatriate personal service contractors. The embassy staff was even smaller. The Department of Defense ini- tially viewed the limitation as a severe challenge, bordering on mission im- possible. Even though most of the 55 advisers, called the Milgroup, were highly trained special operations forces, fluent in Spanish, culturally adapted and vastly experienced, they were in- sufficient to win the war for the Sal- vadorans. But that limitationmotivated theMilgroup to focus on turning the El Salvadoran Armed Forces into a pro- fessional army, which by itself eventu- ally defeated the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. State and USAID made the time- consuming investment to enable the Salvadorans themselves to implement the social, economic and political re- forms needed to convert a feudal sys- tem into a viable democracy. Again, U.S. civilians were highly experienced, culturally sensitive professionals. For most, it was not their “first rodeo,” and they were there for the long haul. In addition, military training conducted outside El Salvador augmented the milgroup’s efforts, and U.S. intelligence gathering and sharing aided the ESAF in fighting insurgents. The process took 12 years and cost us about $4 billion and at least 20 American lives. Even so, congressional restrictions turned out to be a serendip- itous driver, leading to a sustainable peace, the transformation of the FMLN into a loyal democratic opposi- tion, and a vibrant economy supported by good governance and the rule of law. The strategy was an example of “smart power” long before that term came into use. Since 2002, the United States has invested more than $130 billion in se- curity, economic and governance assist- ance to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan (not including military operations). Over the same period, the United States has spent more than $55 billion for Afghan security, governance and de- velopment, and more than $18 billion to assist Pakistan, according to the Gov- ernment Accountability Office —with no end in sight. For FY 2012, the administration has requested $3.2 billion in operating ex- penses just for the State and USAID contingents in Iraq. There is no question that State and USAID personnel need to be aug- mented if they are to meet their re- sponsibilities for diplomacy and development and the projection of “smart power.” Unfortunately, the QDDR’s vision for achieving this, rooted in the whole-of-government ap- proach, is neither smart nor fiscally sus- tainable. Instead, let us embrace the premise that diplomacy and development work should both be practiced by a highly trained and experienced cadre of pro- fessionals. James “Spike” Stephenson, a retired USAID Senior Foreign Service officer, has worked for 32 years in the field of development in conflict and post-con- flict environments. He spent 13 months as mission director in Iraq (2004-2005) and, until his retirement from the For- eign Service in 2005, was a senior ad- viser to the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. He also served as a USAID mission director in Serbia and Montenegro and in Lebanon, and in a variety of positions in Egypt, Barbados, Grenada, El Salvador, the Philippines and Washington, D.C. He is now the senior adviser for sta- bilization and development at Creative Associates International, and a frequent lecturer and guest speaker on the changing nature of conflict and post- conflict engagement and civilian/mili- tary cooperation. S P E A K I N G O U T