The Foreign Service Journal, October 2013

30 OCTOBER 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL matrix. The threat matrix involved the integration of such considerations as the potential for harm to person- nel, the degree of harm, and the irreversibility of detri- ment to the mission’s objec- tives should the mission fail. A key premise was that corps members voluntarily assumed inherent risk, recogniz- ing that it was impossible to avoid danger when carrying out overseas missions. But that did not mean it was acceptable to be reckless. Instead, we adhered to practices USAID personnel had developed during earlier operations in Vietnam, El Salva- dor, the Philippines and Iraq. The Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell During my two deployments to eastern Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011, my mission was to help create, and then co-lead, a joint military-civilian team, the Natural Resources Counterin- surgency Cell. Our mission was to deny insurgents access to financial and human capital derived from the illegal exploi- tation of natural resources within the provinces of Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman and Nangarhar. The composition of the NRCC eventually grew to include personnel from USAID and several elements of the U.S. Army: Civil Affairs, Special Forces, Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Teams, and Human Terrain Teams. The primary focus of the NRCC was to ascertain the extent to which profits derived from illegal timber extraction and traf- ficking supported the various insurgent organizations operat- ing in eastern Afghanistan. We also sought to assess the impact of the illegal trade on sustainable development programs and civil society capacity building efforts. We then drew on those findings to design and implement (without the use of contrac- tors) programs to disrupt insurgent smuggling networks and promote local self-sufficiency in forest-based villages. Our first step was to obtain an estimate of the extent and condition of forests in our section of Afghanistan. With logisti- cal support from Task Force Mountain Warrior, Colonel Randy George and Senior Department of State Representative Dante Paradiso, the NRCC mounted a science-based forest survey and inventory. During a single 30-day period in 2010, I participated in low- altitude helicopter survey flights, foot patrols in the mountains and local meetings on 20 separate missions, operating out of 17 different overwatch posts, combat outposts and forward operating bases. Assets and guidance for these missions were coordinated by the task force’s civil affairs com- mander, Major Clint Hanna. The second phase was to conduct a detailed assess- ment of the structure, control and operation of smuggling networks. This required several months of dismount patrols to investigate clandestine logging operations, saw mills and illicit markets, as well as conduct dozens of interviews with a wide variety of smuggling participants. Once we understood the extent and nature of the timber extraction and smuggling syndicates, we began to organize a response that thwarted the insurgents’ village mobilization efforts. Specifically, the NRCC designed programs to bolster local communities as the primary bulwark against the insurgency, in a manner that reinforced local custom and beliefs. We con- centrated on identifying the men most likely to be recruited by insurgent organizations as mid-level, local leaders. It Takes a Village Consistent with data provided by the USAID Evidence Summit for Countering Insurgency, convened in late 2010 by USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah, NRCC research found that the individual fighter was irrelevant in guerrilla war. Rather, the community is the essential organizational unit. Thus, developing effective tactics to defeat the enemy requires an appreciation of the local social structures that hold the loyalty and respect of these men. That knowledge, in turn, paves the way for programs to decouple the community from the insurgency. Investigating the motivations of these men produced the realization that the desire for economic gain and mate- rial advancement contributed little to the decisions of these particular high-value men to join insurgent groups. The NRCC found that the three primary motivations for joining the insurgency, in descending order of priority, were: the desire to protect local values from outside influences; belief in a theo- cratic social order; and membership in an obligation network requiring loyalty to a person, family, organization or place. The targeted men wished to promote these goals while demonstrating integrity, piety, physical fitness, intellectual acumen and honor. With that in mind, the NRCC partnered Corps members voluntarily assumed inherent risk, recognizing that it was impossible to avoid danger when carrying out overseas missions.