The Foreign Service Journal, October 2013

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2013 31 with Special Forces and Counterinsurgency Advisory & Assistance Teams, which were created in 2009 to conduct timely and accurate assessments of local condi- tions, and make recom- mendations directed at the tactical level across the theater. Some of these teams were tasked with conducting Village Stability Operations, based on the notion that the integration of security, development and governance leads to stability. Under this initiative, Special Forces teams lived in selected communities and established collaborative relationships with villagers and their traditional governance structures. Drawing on Best Practices Expeditionary diplomacy requires the same best practices as other diplomatic and development activities. Close com- munication with supervi- sors and officials back in the embassy and in Washington is essential to ensure unity of effort. Conversely, it also requires constant commu- nication with colleagues and operators in the field to ensure tactical consistency. My own role in the NRCC was officially listed under both chief-of-mission and combatant command authority, in an arrangement that was evocative of some aspects of USAID participation in the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program four decades ago in Vietnam. Coordination with colleagues in the USAID Office of Transi- tion Initiatives, the U.S. National Guard Agribusiness Develop- ment Teams, and the various Provincial Reconstruction Teams located within the NRCC’s area of operations was critical. In the case of USAID CRCA, because of important sensi- Expeditionary diplomacy requires the same best practices as other diplomatic and development activities.