The Foreign Service Journal, October 2013

32 OCTOBER 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL tivities regarding the role of development within a wartime context, a high priority was placed on effec- tive communication with the larger development commu- nity. Corps members were frequently imbedded within military institutions as a force multiplier. As such, they had to take care not to contradict traditional USAID assistance programs. In addition, their activities had to be cognizant of the needs of nongovernmental organiza- tions so as not to engage in conduct that could jeopardize independent humanitarian assistance providers. During my service with USAID CRCA in Afghanistan, I par- ticipated in 58 NRCC missions “outside the wire.” Often, these missions involved finding and inspecting clandestine timber cutting operations, saw mills, wood transit depots and smug- gling routes to Pakistan. Most of these opera- tions took place at the platoon level or with small teams with fewer than six men. About a half-dozen of them involved dismounted patrols between 10 and 15 kilometers in length. One of the most useful outcomes from the NRCC’s work is a detailed description of timber smuggling networks and their relationship with communities. We learned that inter- diction efforts alone, as a mechanism to combat illegal timber exploitation, could not work. As a consequence, changes were made in military tactics, from kinetic operations to develop- ment spending. Assessing the NRCC’s Legacy Beyond that, the ultimate impact of the NRCC on the war effort is difficult to ascertain. The complex interaction of military operations, standard international development programming by USAID and coalition partners, and internal insurgent dynamics creates a milieu within which it is nearly impossible to divine cause and effect. These missions did, however, bring home to us the wisdom of what we had learned during our training: Keep the calculus of risk assessment, mission value and probability of success at the forefront of every decision to undertake a mission. In addition, effective expeditionary diplomacy takes into account both the requirements and the limitations of whole- of-government collaboration. Success demands that no one individual or organization can act unilaterally or in isolation. We all depend on one another. The training and vision of USAID CRCA made clear that our mission was to promote the critical security interests of the United States while ensuring the very highest standards within the American tradition of socioeconomic assistance. I was fortunate to work with 41 other USAID CRCA members that exemplified this commitment. Wherever deployed in the world’s trouble spots, these men and women served with distinction to ensure the peace and prosperity of the United States through a dedication to the alleviation of human suffering. Though the USAID CRCA is scheduled to end soon, and no new appointments will be made as current contracts expire, the CRCA experiment within USAID truly exemplified effective expeditionary diplomacy. n One of the most useful outcomes from the NRCC is the detailed description of timber smuggling networks and their relationship with communities. Moving? Take AFSAWith You! Change your address online, visit us at www.afsa.org/address_change.aspx Or Send change of address to: AFSAMembership Department 2101 E Street NW Washington, DC 20037