The Foreign Service Journal, October 2013

34 OCTOBER 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL thinker, Pogo, who observed: “We have met the enemy, and he is us.” What Went Wrong? After a good start by President George H.W. Bush, we decided “it’s the economy, stupid,” and focused inward. As a result, we prospered domes- tically, but with no viable strategy; and we were tentative and inconsistent internationally. Overly involved in Somalia, we departed ignominiously. We hesitated over NATO expansion, and in strategically important Yugoslavia, and then stood and watched the Rwandan genocide. In Haiti, we got it right—on our second try. We were not alone in our hesitancy. Our European allies, older and supposedly wiser, obsessed over the European Union and dismantled their militaries. Also lacking a strategy, they badly fumbled the Balkan and Caucasus crises in their own backyard. These mistakes cost, as power ebbed away. After 9/11 a “pendulum swing” (to which Americans are susceptible) made us overconfident and impulsive. We adopted another false slogan, “global war on terror.” President Bush 43 said history offered no guidance for this unique, new, global threat—which was neither unique nor global. We enjoyed initial success against the Taliban and al- Qaida, but without a strategic vision, mission creep led to a decade-long attempt to restructure Afghan society—ignoring the country’s history, culture and politics, as well as South Asian power relationships. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s declaration that “The mission determines the alliance; the alliance does not determine the mission” epito- mized the hubris of the time. Without finishing Afghanistan, or pausing to think, we sought another monster to destroy and started a second land war in the region. The administration belittled its partners’ concerns about Iraq, and offered widely-differing explana- tions and objectives for the intervention, including the belief that it could transform the Middle East. Because the two wars competed for scarce resources, nei- ther got enough. Both campaigns were conducted off-budget, sapping our economic strength. These expensive, inconclu- sive conflicts have contributed mightily to our economic, political and military deficiencies today. We suffered from strategic astigmatism by following slogans, not coherent strategy. It is time for a reassessment, and time to educate the Ameri- can people in national secu- rity fundamentals. Leaders who cannot explain strategy, or mistake tactical success for strategic strength, fail in an essential duty. Both in the White House and in Congress, leaders of both parties have been guilty of this failure. By contrast with the aftermath of World War II, they have neither debated national strategy nor drawn the public into a discussion of it. Instead, our leaders are mired in petty, partisan bickering over incon- sequential matters. As a result, national misconceptions about the respective roles of foreign policy and military policy cloud our thinking, distort our worldview and overstate our ability to change that world. Rebalancing the Elements: Foreign Policy Let’s begin with foreign policy, and its means of imple- mentation, diplomacy. The House Appropriations Commit- tee’s benighted and destructive deprecation of foreign policy is symptomatic of a distorted view of this central pillar of national security. Congress’s disregard for diplomacy and fascination with force undermine national security. The attitude reflects recent American impatience with the complexities of foreign policy, and a desire for simple, tough-guy quick fixes. Military action tends to evoke positive popular and congressional responses, at least initially. Yet the use of force is never quick, simple or cost-free. To rebalance strategy, our leaders must revalue foreign policy. Since Richard Nixon, we have not had an articulate president explain the strategic role of foreign policy to the American people. President George H.W. Bush understood and valued diplomacy, but could not articulate “the vision thing.” His successors neither articulated it nor understood it. This has left the public adrift and our policy weak. Today we again face protracted struggles, not unlike the Cold War. We can start a national discussion by recalling three Cold War lessons, which largely explain our success in that 45-year effort, as well as our failures in the two decades since. n We succeeded primarily through vigorous diplomacy, backed (not led) by a strong, properly structured military force. n We were strongest when we attracted, not demanded, the support of our allies and partners. As part of our outreach, we accommodated their interests and viewpoints. We suffer from a formof national narcissism, falling in love with our ownmilitarymight.