The Foreign Service Journal, October 2013

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2013 35 Effective field operations take into account both the requirements and the limitations of whole-of-government collaboration. n We cultivated our economic, political, cultural and ideological power, while neither ignoring nor exaggerating military power. The Cold War is an excellent example of how complex power levers, manipulated wisely, can reduce the need for force, and succeed efficiently and effectively. The Shield and the Sword Seventy years ago, during World War II, Walter Lippmann wrote a book, Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic . As the title suggests, the Shield, foreign policy, comes first and, when properly used, reduces the need to employ the Sword, mili- tary force. The role of foreign policy in peacetime is to hold up the Shield and to guide the Sword. Properly balanced, the two work symbiotically. No recent president has used the bully pulpit to proclaim this central tenet. Our leaders are not telling the public that the Shield is the most cost-effective method to defend the republic, and that the Sword backs up our policies. We rightly support our military, yet Congress denigrates diplomacy and beggars foreign policy through budget cuts. Its persistent and consistent message to the public is this: military force counts; diplomacy is a waste of money. Foreign policy and diplomats are like football linemen— noticed only for mistakes. The public does not understand that these linemen build and maintain the alliances and coalitions, increasing the effectiveness of the Sword. In ordi- nary times, diplomats are the peacekeepers. Unfortunately, diplomacy is largely conducted overseas and out of sight. It has a weak constituency compared to the huge military-industrial complex that dominates our Con- gress and blinds it to military limitations. There is neither a diplomatic-industrial complex, nor a Chamber of Diplomacy supporting foreign policy. After Benghazi, diplomacy has gotten more recognition, but for the wrong reasons. Our major problem is not bad talk- ing points, or defending our embassies. Ignorance of the role of foreign policy is a strategic weakness. That is the problem we need to focus on, not finding scapegoats for the tragedy in Benghazi. In our approach we differ from our British allies, who long ago learned that the Shield is their first and best defense, and is almost always more effi- cient and effective than the Sword. Such an understand- ing is the way to long-term success. Rebalancing the Elements: The Military Far from disparaging military power, I welcome it. After all, a foreign policy unsup- ported by adequate military power is sterile and unsuccess- ful. At the same time, military force not guided by a coherent foreign policy is reckless and destructive. Because we have forgotten that truth, we suffer from a form of national narcissism; we have fallen in love with our own military might. We have been excessively militaristic since 9/11. Our military leaders understand the problem and are not infatuated with force. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has flatly declared that “U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military.” He amended the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine with Mullen’s Corollary: We will commit military force “only if and when the other instru- ments of national power are ready to engage, as well.” Along the same lines, former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates said specifically that military operations should be “subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better gov- ernance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented.” That sounds strikingly like what diplomats do every day. An intensive national debate established a balanced strat- egy after World War II. The wisdom of those “present at the creation” laid the foundation for successes by eight presi- dents, who adopted and adapted the strategy of containment. In his book, Lippmann defined a correct, effective foreign policy based on a principle we seem to have forgotten: “In foreign relations, as in all other relations, a policy has been formed only when commitments and power have been brought into balance. … [T]he nation must maintain its objec- tives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes. Its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its com- mitments. … [Without this principle] it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.” Lippmann’s admonition remains valid 70 years later. Our policies today are in disequilibrium. The world has changed.