The Foreign Service Journal, October 2013

36 OCTOBER 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Since Richard Nixon, we have not had an articulate teacher at the bully pulpit explaining the strategic role of foreign policy. It is less dangerous, but also more complicated, than it was during the Cold War. We now risk suffering a thousand cuts, not one mas- sive strike. But instead of aligning our military structures, doctrines and missions to reflect this understanding, we have abused and exhausted our military personnel and equipment. Our armed forces always salute and say “can do,” even when they never should have been asked. Lacking strategic priori- ties, America has overused the Sword, so that its blade is now chipped and dulled. And these are only the political-military policies. Indus- trial, financial, trade, environmental, refugees, human rights and nonproliferation policy all need strategic prioritization. Strategy is about priorities, yet our pendulum swings dem- onstrate we have not established priorities. Tactics rule when strategy is uncertain, and the nation is weakened. Today presents the best opportunity since 1993 to rebal- ance national security. Fortunately, the beginnings of that process are already visible. President Barack Obama and our military leaders deserve credit for recognizing the need to reassess, rebuild at home and revivify alliances and partner- ships. A national discussion of national security strategy is the next step. Toward a Post-9/11 National Security Strategy Here are some principles for that strategy: n Domestic strength is absolutely fundamental. Our strong- est assets are our economy, society, culture, political institu- tions and democratic ideology. Let us rebuild these first, without partisanship. n The essence of strategy is to balance commitments with capabilities by setting priorities that recognize our strengths and limitations. Our reach should exceed our grasp only in our aspira- tions, never in our actions. n We should restructure our military and diplomatic resources so each plays its proper role. Flexibility, agility and imagination are critical. In peacetime, the Shield guides the Sword, which is used only when the Shield is insufficient. n We should strengthen alliances, partnerships, international organizations and relations with new, emerging powers. No great nation has remained great, except as the leader of a powerful coalition. n We should work hard, but patiently, to promote international stability, the rule of law and respect for liberty, and should give a high priority to transnational issues. At the same time, how- ever, we must understand and accept that most nations’ interests are different from ours. Regional Issues n Our Asia-Pacific “pivot” should make clear our desire that no one nation dominate the region. n With that in mind, we should maintain our Asian-Pacific regional alliances and presence, and strengthen partnerships. These threaten no one, but they enhance regional stability, as they did in Europe during the Cold War. n We cannot and should not “contain” China, but should pursue mutually beneficial cooperation and encourage Beijing to assume a stabilizing role as a major power. n We should continue to support NATO and a revitalized European Union, whose members should employ active leader- ship in Europe and well beyond. Promoting democracy and development in Eastern Europe continues an important objec- tive, but must be balanced with mutually beneficial relations with Russia—even as Russian democracy fails. n We should encourage modern, pluralist societies in Africa, the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world, discouraging radical ideologies that espouse rigid, militant intolerance. But we should actively oppose only regimes that are actively hostile to us. n In our Western Hemisphere neighborhood, democratic sta- bility with economic and social development must be our focus, especially in Mexico, Brazil and the Caribbean. A hemisphere- wide free trade agreement should be a cornerstone strategic objective. Bucking the Trend Let me end as I began, on a historical note—a caution- ary observation, not a prediction. For the past 500 years, the world’s leading power at the turn of each century has lost that position within the first 30 to 50 years of the new century. If we are to buck that historical trend, we will need to be much smarter and more agile than we have been recently. Fortunately, we have managed that feat before. And we can do so again. n