The Foreign Service Journal, October 2015

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2015 21 The military contends with an extensive amount of legal and regulatory strictures: international law, domestic legislation, military regulations and operational rules. trine alone consists of 16 Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs), 16 Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRPs), more than 100 Army Techniques Publications (ATPs) and more than 200 Field Manuals (FMs). By comparison, the Foreign Affairs Manual and the Foreign Affairs Handbook are an easy read. 4 THE MILITARY AS A PROFESSION Much has been written about apparent differences between FSOs and their military counterparts. The Venus/Mars distinction was described 25 years ago. Many now believe that depiction is outdated, but differences do still exist. The military, for example, tends to see things in black and white, while the Foreign Service is more sensitive to shades of grey. Military characterizations frequently are in absolute terms; FS personnel are more com- fortable with nuance and subtlety. One inescapable difference remains: the military is a true profession, while the Foreign Service could be described as a pseudo profession, with elitism passing for professionalism. (Ambassador Charles Ray’s article on what constitutes a profession and the need for a professional Foreign Service in the July-August issue of the FSJ brings this issue front and center and hopefully galvanizes needed action.) An important element of a military professional common to all the services is the mastery and credentialing of essential military skills and abilities. In addition, military members are subject to continual professional development and education throughout their careers, attending military schools such as the Command and General Staff College as majors and the Army, Naval, Air Force, Marine Corps and National War Colleges as col- onels. Correspondence and Internet-based courses also abound. It is, therefore, not surprising that most military officers have an advanced degree. Many have two or more. 5 LEGAL RESTRAINTS The military contends with an extensive amount of legal and regulatory strictures: international law, domestic legislation, military regula- tions and operational rules. These are enforced with a separate judicial system known as the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Consequently, all commanders, unlike ambassadors, have law- yers on their staff to help navigate this massive legalese and to help administer the UCMJ. Unfortunately, the Army is at times captured by the legal pro- cess itself. What has evolved is a belief by many in the Army that almost every proposed action or activity requires explicit legal authorization or approval from someone higher in the chain of command. This cautious approach contrasts with the view of rules and regulations held both by the Navy and the Foreign Service. For those two organizations the view is reversed, with activities or actions usually considered favorably for imple- mentation unless explicitly prohibited in writing. This caution may explain an initial circumspect reaction by a commander to the ambassador’s request or suggestion due to the need to first check with the lawyers. 6 TENSION IN THE RANKS Congress created the U.S. Special Operations Command in 1987 and deliberately gave it distinct, Service-like responsibilities, making it unique among the nine COCOMs. Unlike the others, it is the responsibility of the USSOCOM commander to organize, train and equip special operations forces (SOF) for current and future requirements in addition to commanding their day-to-day opera- tional missions. The USSOCOM congressional charter overrides the historical division of responsibility between commanders and the secretaries of the military departments (Army, Navy and Air Force), giving USSOCOM greater bureaucratic independence and operational freedom. Some now see the U.S. military as consisting of the five traditional service branches, plus the hybrid USSOCOM operating as a de facto sixth branch. This bureaucratic independence in Washington is mirrored with command independence in combat as well as peacetime missions. Traditionally, in an area of operations (AO) there would be an Army or Marine Corps commander in charge of all land forces reporting to the geographic COCOM. With the advent of USSOCOM, there are now two separate land com- manders sharing responsibility for land operations. With SOF under a separate command, a conventional commander’s view of the AO may have significant blank spots, making it more dif- ficult to integrate capabilities and avoid fratricide. Having two separate commanders in the same AO increases significantly