The Foreign Service Journal, October 2015

22 OCTOBER 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL From the military’s perspective, State’s biggest shortfall is a failure to provide military planners and commanders with achievable political objectives. the coordination required. Complicating this coordination is the “black ops” or compartmentalized nature of many SOF missions, which precludes sharing all operational details with other com- manders. The Army and SOF do work to overcome this tension, but each case provides unique coordination challenges which may gain the attention of the ambassador. 7 THE ARMY'S INDENTITY CRISIS The Army is the oldest service, established by the Continental Congress on June 14, 1775. For the next two centuries its purpose and mission were clearly understood by the public, congressional com- mittees and its soldiers. The Army had a role, and usually a critical one, as the “force of decision” in every major conflict during that period. Times and the potential threats facing the United States have changed, and the Army is now concerned that its central role in the defense of the nation is being challenged, giving the other military branches—especially the Marine Corps and USSOCOM— an advantage in public support and congressional funding. The Army’s response has been to become a more agile and expedition- ary force in an effort tomeet today’s range of threats. But that comes at a price. Does it cut back on the number of tanks and other heavy equipment to gain deployment speed at the expense of firepower and maneuverability? It is not an easy question, and the Army continues to explore it. Pending cuts in the number of Army soldiers and uncertain congressional sup- port make shaping the force of the future even more difficult. 8 WHAT THE AIRFORCE AND NAVY WANT FROM STATE The Air Force and Navy have similar needs. Each is concerned with access and use of host nation facilities, ports and air fields for military and humanitarian mis- sions. The Navy also seeks to maintain freedom of navigation in disputed or contested areas such as the Black Sea and the South China Sea. State Department and embassy involvement in nego- tiating access and related agreements is critical in meeting these Air Force and Navy operational requirements. 9 WHAT THE ARMY WANTS FROM STATE The Army wants two things from State. First, it wants greater State involvement in planning for and handling civil affairs responsibilities during and after combat operations. War games —or “experiments,” in Army jargon—have identified a need for increased numbers of civil affairs units capable of dealing with the myriad issues once combat forces have moved on. How- ever, many in the Army would like the civil affairs responsibility turned over largely to State and USAID altogether. The Army wants the two organizations to be responsible for reestablishing the full range of local government institutions and the condi- tions needed to promote private enterprise. To help meet its advance planning requirements, the Army wants Foreign Service help in developing more explicit and measurable policies and practices to guide civil affairs efforts. Second, it wants our embassies to support its program of regionally aligned forces (RAF). The RAF units operate in what the military calls the Shaping Phase or Phase 0 of its planning continuum. For the Foreign Service, this is a period of normal, routine, non-crisis conditions. The RAF concept calls for units to be forward-deployed, stationed and operating in a COCOM’s area of responsibility with the full knowledge and consent of the respective ambassador. These units conduct operational mis- sions, bilateral and multilateral exercises and theater security cooperation activities. The expectation is that the RAF program will provide military units and personnel with a better under- standing of local cultures and languages, thus enabling stron- ger relationships with host nation militaries. Finally, the Army expects the RAF to foster a better, closer integration between the Army and State’s ambassadors and country teams abroad. 10 THE EXPECTATIONS GAP The military wants State to live up to its perceived responsibilities and provide needed policy guidance to help shape the range of military operations. From the military’s perspective, State’s biggest shortfall is a failure to provide military planners and commanders with achievable political objectives. Without those clearly defined political objectives, the military will focus on strictly military objectives and establish a military definition of victory. In addition, it expects State to stay closely engaged during hostilities to provide guidance on how to adjust to and exploit the developing political situation, knowing that merely killing bad