The Foreign Service Journal, October 2015

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2015 65 and small-scale entrepreneurs. Readers should forgive the fact that the concluding chapter is disjointed and introduces themes not previously explored in the book (e.g., immigration and climate change). At its core, Rudel’s narrative represents a solid contribution to the chronicles of development assistance, the lessons of which should serve as a refer- ence to those negotiating the post-2015 development agenda. Maria C. Livingston is the Journal’s associate editor. Asking Important Questions Mission Creep:TheMilitarization of U.S. Foreign Policy? Gordon Adams and ShoonMurray, editors. Georgetown University Press, 2014, paperback/$32.08, Kindle Edition/$22.33, 256 pages. Reviewed By Charles A. Ray Mission Creep: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy? addresses the growing role of the Department of Defense and the mili- tary in the conduct of activities abroad that traditionally have been under the purview of the Department of State. With experience in themilitary (20 years) and as a Foreign Service officer (30 years), I have to start by saying that the question mark in the title should be removed. There is little doubt that U.S. foreign policy since the early 1940s has been characterized by an increasing reliance on use of force, or the threat of use of force, instead of reliance on the murkier and often uncertain outcomes that traditional diplomacy achieves. The essays in this book, some written by experienced diplomatic practitioners and some by academics, address this trend as it’s developed, primarily since the events of 9/11, when the United States embarked on the Global War on Terrorism. The authors show how the country’s senior leadership has tended to look at the military and DOD as the go-to resource to get things done abroad in the name of national security. In her essay, “Foreign Assistance in Camouflage,” Nina M. Serafino, a researcher for the Congressional Research Service, points out that, despite the com- mon belief that DOD’s encroachment on traditional diplomatic turf grew out of 9/11, it has, in fact, been a growing trend since WorldWar II, with the creation of the President’s National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947. I would expand onMs. Serafino’s thesis, and point out that during the war, the State Department was sidelined by President Roosevelt, and that it played only a minor supporting role in implementation of the post-war Marshall Plan. Further, a student of American history will note that, prior to the war, State con- cerned itself with traditional diplomacy (commerce, treaties, observing and reporting) and was ill-equipped and reluctant to take on the broad range of tasks the country faced abroad after the war. Thus, not only in security-related fields, but in commerce and agri- culture, other government departments stepped in to fill the void. After WorldWar II the United States had to finally acknowledge that it was a world power in every sense of the word, and that it had to accept certain global responsibilities. With a preference for short-termdirect action, the American character unfortunately lends itself to use of military instruments. And, when combined with a historical distrust of diplomacy and diplomats, there should be no surprise that with the focus on national security our foreign policy would become militarized. This book is an excellent starting point for the national debate that is long overdue on the question of the long-term conse- quences of assigning the military to duties that are not part of its core mission. It is not just a matter of the potential negative consequences on the military and its abil- ity, when necessary, to fight and win the nations’ wars. Do we really want the rest of the world to see our foreign policy as being carried out by uniforms and guns? Nomatter how you package it, the military is perceived as a coercive instrument, and when that is the face we present to the world, it will make it harder for us to find those willing to collaborate. The most important essay, inmy view, is the final one, by Gordon Adams, “Con- clusion: Does Mission CreepMatter?” Says Adams: “The most significant negative consequence of the militariza- tion trend for U.S. foreign policy is the increased risk of ‘blowback.’ The more the military assumes a central role in U.S. foreign policy, the more it is turned to for non-core missions, the more the international com- munity may come to see U.S. international engagement as wearing a uniform.” If the reader takes away noth- ing else from this study, that pas- sage wouldmake it worthwhile. n Ambassador (ret.) Charles A. Ray retired from the Foreign Service in 2012 after a 30-year career that included ambassadorships to Cambodia and Zimbabwe. Prior to joining the Foreign Service, Amb. Ray spent 20 years in the U.S. Army.