The Foreign Service Journal, October 2016

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2016 41 An Unprecedented Lobbying Effort After the election, Perot campaigned vigorously against con- gressional approval of NAFTA, stepping up his media offensive against the agreement. Unconcerned that Ross Perot would win the presidential election, given that he did not represent a major political party, Mexican leaders nevertheless believed Perot was a threat because his anti-NAFTA arguments could influence mem- bers of Congress who were undecided about the agreement. NAFTA was so vital to Mexico that its government launched an unprecedented, massive lobbying and public education campaign to influence members of Congress to approve the treaty. Mexico’s NAFTA office in Washington hired several prestigious Washington public relations, lobbying and law firms. Mexican private-sector executives met with visiting American congressional and business delegations to advocate for NAFTA. Mexico’s 42 consulates in the United States conducted a grassroots campaign, particularly in districts whose congressmen were undecided, urging American citizens to write to their representatives in support of NAFTA. Von Bertrab estimated that the Mexican government spent roughly $10 million in 1993 and some $18 million during 1991 and 1992 on NAFTA-related activities. Suarez Mier recalled that Mexico spent more, about $50 million throughout the U.S., in an effort to improve Mexico’s image and persuade undecided mem- bers of Congress to support NAFTA. Perot criticized lobbyists for influencing congressional decisions on free trade agreements that cost American jobs. He denounced the “revolving door” of former U.S. officials who left the U.S. government to work with lobbying and public relations firms contracted by Mexico. Mexico’s lobbying effort in support of NAFTA was conducted in cooperation with the U.S. administration. Von Bertrab recalled that in the run-up to a vote in the House of Representatives, most letters to members of Congress opposed the agreement. Con- cerned, Von Bertrab thought another high-profile public debate was needed. Vice President Al Gore agreed to debate Perot. Mex- ico’s NAFTA office provided Gore with data that exposed Perot’s inconsistencies and highlighted his business interests in Mexico. On Nov. 9, 1993, Gore smoothly outperformed an irritable Perot in a televised debate on the controversial agreement. Before the debate, polls indicated that only 34 percent of Americans supported it. Immediately following the debate, support surged to 57 percent. The House of Representatives approved NAFTA on Nov. 17 by 34 votes (234 to 200), and three days later the Senate approved it by a margin of 61-38. The NAFTA negotiations raised the level of trust between the two governments. Mexico has long upheld the principle of non- intervention in the internal affairs of other states and has insisted that other governments, especially the United States, refrain from intervening in Mexico’s internal affairs. Mexico’s sensitivi- ties on that score were evident in 1984 when Ambassador John Gavin held a meeting in the northern state of Sonora with leaders of the opposition National Action Party (PAN) and a Catholic archbishop. Mexico’s ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the local press were outraged, citing the meeting as an example of U.S. interference in Mexico’s internal electoral pro- cess. Gavin’s pointed reminder that the Mexican ambassador in Washington frequently held meetings with Democratic members of Congress did not convince his critics that they were upholding a double standard. A Tested Partnership The relationship between the United States and Mexico improved dramatically during the early 1990s. Mexico’s lobby- ing campaign in the United States to advocate congressional approval of the agreement could not have been successful with- out the cooperation of the Bush and Clinton administrations. The joint effort to attain NAFTA ratification transformed the United States and Mexico from “distant neighbors”—the title of Alan Rid- ing’s excellent study—into trusted partners. Many Mexicans now see this partnership, which has been through other crises since NAFTA came into effect in 1994, threatened by the rhetoric of the U.S. presidential campaign. Jorge Castaneda asserted that the Mexican government should openly state that Donald Trump’s statements are not conducive to the type of relationship Mexico wants with the United States. Suarez Mier, now an independent consultant, suggested that the Mexican embassy in Washington and its consulates across the country meet with Hispanic groups to persuade them to motivate their people to vote. According to Bloomberg News, Mexican NAFTAwas so vital to Mexico that its government launched an unprecedented, massive lobbying and public education campaign to influence members of Congress to approve the treaty.