The Foreign Service Journal, October 2018

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2018 15 the microwave theory “crazy” and said that while he can’t explain what hap- pened to the diplomats and their fami- lies, “it’s sure as heck not microwaves.” On Aug. 30, the State Department released the results of an Accountability Review Board convened in January 2018 to review the circumstances surrounding the medical problems in Havana. The ARB found that “the department’s secu- rity systems and procedures were overall adequate and properly implemented, though there were significant vacancies in security staffing and some challenges with information sharing and communi- cation.” The ARB issued 30 recommendations in the areas of accountability, inter- agency coordination, medical issues, communication and information shar- ing, risk/benefit analysis and diplomatic security. All 30 recommendations were accepted by the department. Brian Mazanec, acting director of international affairs and trade at the Government Accountability Office, explained the delay in convening an ARB thus, according to Federal Times : “The offices in State weren’t communicating the way they should have. When these incidents were occurring, several State offices were responding, but the office responsible for initiating the process to consider whether or not to convene an accountability review board was not aware of the incidents.” The Return of the Special Envoy O n Sept. 4 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo confirmed the appoint- ment of Zalmay Khalilzad as special adviser for Afghanistan. Khalilzad, who served as U.S. ambas- sador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations during the George W. Bush I want to tell you a story about the art of the deal—the Iran deal, for which I was the lead negotiator. 1/14 We negotiated the deal at the Palais Coburg Hotel in Vienna. I thought I’d be home in short order. 2/14 By day 25 I had barely left the hotel and had eaten only 1 meal outside the Coburg. Every rod and rack inmy bathroomhad hand-washed laundry. 3/14 We called our side the P5+1: US, England, France, Germany, Russia, China and the EU. 4/14 Diplomacy can test your patience. There were somany interlocking issues to cover: how to verify Iran’s compliance, how to limit its centrifuges, how to ‘snapback’ sanctions if needed, etc. 5/14 Every time one element of the deal changed, we had to renegotiate within the P5+1 and EU, then go back to the Iranians again. It was like a Rubik’s Cube. Solve one side and you’ve jumbled the others. 6/14 After dinner on the 25th day, I met with Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s lead negotiator, with his partner, Majid Takata-Ravanchi, to go over one final UN resolution. 7/14 Araghchi agreed to key points, but then leaned forward and began to dispute a previously agreed upon point. 8/14 This was familiar Iranian negotiation style: just as consensus seemed imminent, there would be one more point of contention. We’ve given you what you want; now give us something of ours you’ve taken. 9/14 I lost it. I began to tell, and tomy frustration and fury, my eyes began to well up with tears. I told themhow their tactics jeopardized the entire deal. 10/14 Women are told early in life that it’s not socially acceptable to get angry. And it’s a sign of weakness to let people see you cry. 11/14 Aragchi and Ravanchi were stunned. For a first time in a month, they were silent. 12/14 Something in the sincerity of my frustration broke through. After a long silent moment, Aragchi dismissed his objection. That tearful reckoning became the final substantive turn of the Rubik’s cube. 13/14 That’s when it clicked into place for me. When you bring values like authen- ticity, persistence, and commitment to the negotiating table, both in work and personal life, you are enormously powerful. 14/14 —Tweet byWendy R. Sherman, Sept. 5, www.bit-ly/WShermanAStory. Contemporary Quote: