The Foreign Service Journal, October 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2020 25 to provide additional context for their previous performance. Mission and office senior leadership, in consultation with each other and bureau stakeholders, assess bidders’ strengths and weaknesses, weighing them against the particular needs of the role, to identify the best person to fill the vacancy. In practice, this rarely happens. Every FSO knows someone who received a “handshake” offer for an assignment without speaking to anyone about it, and they know of colleagues who were pushed out of contention by other FS members lacking the requisite grade, experience or practical skills. Decision-makers do not receive training on how to evaluate either the positions they fill or the candidates they interview in terms of identifying critical skills and abilities to ensure an effective match between the two, nor do they have any quantitative measures of the can- didates’ performance. The only “external” evaluations are the recommendations completed by former colleagues selected by the candidate. Decision-makers are, therefore, forced to rely on highly subjec- tive material in selecting officers for assignments, including the favorable endorsement of the cadre of highly placed friends, former colleagues and senior leaders deployed by officers to lobby on their behalf. Compounding these problems is the fact that many decision-makers will themselves move on before or shortly after the new officer arrives, meaning they have no “skin in the game” in their own decisions. Here, the lack of fundamental management skills can have far-reaching negative consequences for entire sections and mis- sions. No matter how busy they are with other tasks, effective managers understand the criticality of having the right people in place; staffing decisions are among the most important actions they will take during their careers, and they prioritize them accordingly. Officers assigned to roles they are unable to fill suc- cessfully jeopardize the ability to meet mission goals, under- mine morale and set a poor example for more junior officers to follow. FSOs empowered to make assignments must ensure they identify selection criteria objectively and base candidate evalua- tions on those standards instead of personal connections or gut instinct. The latter has been shown repeatedly to favor those who resemble the decision-maker, thereby inhibiting diversity at all levels of the Foreign Service. The Value of Road Maps and Data For entry into the Senior Foreign Service, the department has issued (and revised) a checklist of requirements; interested offi- cers must take personal responsibility for ensuring they meet the minimum necessary to put themselves forward for consideration. Why has State not taken a similar approach to tenure and promo- tion requirements, focusing on tangible, measurable skills?These “road maps” would provide raters and reviewers with tools to evaluate officers, while allowing tenure and promotion panels to compare apples to apples. Similarly, with quantitative data, FSOs who supervise others (including LE staff, whose performance and development are often severely neglected in favor of their FSO colleagues) can be evaluated on how well they manage their team members. On a more macro scale, performance data provides leaders at all levels of the department with ongoing feedback on how well their workforce is executing the policies and projects that advance U.S. foreign policy, as well as gauging the engagement and satis- faction of that workforce. The importance of this last component cannot be overstated: Like all professionals, FSOs expect—and deserve—to be valued, respected and treated fairly. When those elements are absent, job performance suffers as officers disengage or separate from the department, imposing obstacles to policy execution and leading to an incalculable loss of the knowledge, experience and mentorship so critical to a profession that relies heavily on learning the job by doing it. While training can enhance management tradecraft, it seldom instills the recognition of its intrinsic value effectively. The Foreign Service Institute’s financial management courses, for example, teach how to reconcile fiscal statements, not why reconciling them is necessary. Too often, FSI’s management tradecraft training prioritizes a hodgepodge of outdated tools over foundational skills in planning, executing and evaluating based on data, mission goals and a strategic mindset. These are the skills fundamental to every role, at every level in the Foreign Service, from the entry-level first-time control officer to the chief of mission rallying her team through a global pandemic. Prioritizing strong people and project management puts the focus squarely on skills that advance the department and reflects the evolving realities of the 21st-century workplace. Incorporating good management tradecraft has the dual benefit of enhancing engagement while leveling the playing field for all officers. Strong managers empower their teammembers by ensuring they have the resources they need to execute their jobs, including materi- als, training, coaching and, when necessary, correction. Most importantly, they instill confidence that their teammembers will be treated fairly, evaluated on their contributions, valued for their inherent diversity and vigorously defended if the first three are threatened. The best performing organizations demand adher- ence to this mindset; as envoys of the American experiment, the professionals of the U.S. Foreign Service deserve nothing less. n