The Foreign Service Journal, October 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2020 55 Stettinius also nurtured Yost’s expertise in U.N. affairs by directing him to assist with writing the crucial Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and assigning him as his aide and principal drafter at the 1945 San Francisco Conference. Yost served Secretary of State James Byrnes, who replaced Stettinius in July 1945, at the Potsdam Conference before being posted to Thailand as U.S. Minister. Yet Yost’s revolving high-profile positions had an unwelcome result—namely, the renewed attention of FBI Director Hoover. As a result of President Truman’s Executive Order 9835 (also known as the Loyalty Order, which established the Federal Employees Loyalty Program in 1947), anonymous accusations were being made about many employees and would end the careers of an untold number. Yost’s own career would soon hang in the balance. The Perils of Dangerous Thoughts In 1949 it became apparent that U.S. policy on China was in disarray. As the Chinese civil war was raging, the Truman administration found itself caught between the department’s “China hands,” those who were recommending liaising with Mao’s communists because they would most likely prevail, and the Republican-led “China Lobby,” those who were pushing for expanded U.S. support for Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. Acheson directed his team to undertake a historical study that would defend against critics who blamed the administra- tion for “losing” China. The result was the China White Paper, which some historians assert was principally authored by Yost. It caused a firestorm. It also renewed Republican assertions that the Democrats had in fact “lost” China, to which Yost retorted: “Chiang Kai-shek lost China because he was in charge.” Despite evidence presented to the loyalty boards (see sidebar, p. 54) supporting their patriotism and independe nce, including Yost’s testimony for John S. Service, most of the China experts at State were fired or forced to resign. As a result, Yost believed, FSOs who would have helped the United States navigate China affairs—and who could have predicted and pos- sibly prevented U.S. entry into the Korean and Vietnam wars, as well—had now been eliminated. But the situation was about to get worse. In 1950 Senator Joseph McCarthy claimed that he had a list of “known communists” in the State Department. For Yost, the loyalty boards and McCarthy era represented a time of “sickness that disfigured and weakened America.” And in 1950, prior to assuming his duties as minister to Greece, he found there would be no letup. FBI Director Hoover ordered a new investigation into Yost, admonishing his agents: UNITEDNATIONS/YUTAKANAGATA From left, President Richard M. Nixon, Secretary of State William P. Rogers and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Charles Yost at the U.N. General Assembly in 1970. Acheson directed his team to undertake a historical study that would defend against critics who blamed the administration for “losing” China.