The Foreign Service Journal, October 2021

28 OCTOBER 2021 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL the George W. Bush administration followed up with National Security Presidential Directive-44, giving State specific guidanc e to “prepare for, plan, and conduct [reconstruction and stabiliza- tion] operations.” After several years of S/CRS initiatives to test these concepts, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton turned S/CRS into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) in 2011, refining its task to “serve as the institutional locus for policy and operational solutions for crisis, conflict and instability.” The change from S/CRS to CSO was both intellectual and bureaucratic. Intellectually, by 2011 conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq had undercut the technocratic assumptions behind “recon- struction and stabilization,” leading to the removal of “reconstruc- tion” as overly ambitious. Organizationally, CSO would no longer aspire to be a “whole-of-government czar.” Instead, it would be a department functional bureau focused on conflict. Although State decided CSO would be its locus for stabiliza- tion, no one formally defined stabilization for the U.S. govern- ment until 2018, when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis and USAID Administrator Mark Green agreed on the Stabilization Assistance Review that defined stabilization as: “a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legiti- mate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. Transitional in nature, sta- bilization may include efforts to establish civil security, provide access to dispute resolution, deliver targeted basic services, and establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development.” The 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review correctly placed the onus for stabilization policy on the State Department, reflecting the lesson that while the Defense Department and USAID play essential roles in stabilization, they cannot succeed if State does not succeed in the diplomatic realm—first, in building an inter- national consensus around a conflict; and second, in promoting the political reforms and reconciliation needed for more stable and resilient societies to grow. The Stabilization Assistance Review enshrined the resulting division of labor among the “three Ds”—which later received congressional endorsement in the bipartisan 2020 Global Fragility Act. State was clearly given the lead for stabilization and resilience policy. Deployable Diplomats: “Expeditionary” or “Special Operations”? Accompanying this institutional evolution was refinement of the tools to have at hand. The Biden-Lugar Act called for a Civilian Response Corps of 250 full-time active, rapid-deployment officers; 2,000 standby volunteers recruited among existing U.S. govern- ment employees; and 2,000 reserve personnel drawn from key nonfederal skill sets such as municipal administration. Unfor- tunately, in 2005 S/CRS received only 15 temporary Foreign and Civil Service billets to build a prototype Active Response Corps. Despite the ARC’s small size, by 2008 its successful per- formance in places like Darfur and Kosovo—and domestic agencies’ struggles to staff “surges” in Iraq and Afghanistan— prompted Congress to pass the Biden-Lugar Act and appropriate funds for establishment of the Civilian Response Corps, drawn from the departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and USAID—providing all the skill sets needed to run a city or small country. In four short years under Coordinator John Herbst, the corps made notable contributions to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and South Sudan. The Civilian Response Corps also revealed numerous concep- tual flaws. Its reserve wing never came to be, because Congress would not enact the kinds of employment protections military reservists enjoy. The standby corps learned there really are not loads of civil servants who can be spared from their day jobs in Health and Human Services Civilian Response Corps member Jean Pierre DeBarros, at right, discusses plans with NATO colleagues from the U.K. and Italy during a NATO exercise in Germany in 2009. U.S.DEPARTMENTOFSTATE Robert J. Faucher is the acting assistant secretary for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, class of Minister-Counselor, he joined the Foreign Service in 1985 and has served as deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassies in Belgium, Ireland, Suriname and Luxembourg. John H. Mongan joined the Office of the Coordina- tor for Reconstruction and Stabilization, later CSO, in 2005 and has served in a variety of leadership roles in the bureau, including in field operations in Afghani- stan and in support of the Syrian opposition in Turkey. A former Foreign Service officer, he served tours in Albania, Kosovo and Afghanistan.