The Foreign Service Journal, October 2021

36 OCTOBER 2021 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL signed the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997, he never submitted it to a skeptical Congress, and President George W. Bush acted rapidly after his inauguration to withdraw the U.S. signature. Critics of the Kyoto Protocol faulted the nontransparent way in which targets for developed countries (Annex I signatories) had been negotiated, the lack of obligations on the part of the developing world (Annex II signatories) and the complex “flex- ible mechanisms” that proved difficult to monitor and measure. When Russia became the final signatory needed to bring the agreement into force in February 2005, critics noted that it had ridden a tide of anti-Americanism. Although flawed and without the United States, the protocol was extended past its 2012 expira- tion, while COPs struggled toward next steps. Kyoto’s eventual replacement was the Paris Agreement, adopted at COP 21 in 2015, which is structured very differently. It expresses the overall goal of keeping the global temperature rise at less than 2 degrees Celsius (ideally 1.5 degrees Celsius) above preindustrial levels. Instead of identifying targets to be met by member nations, the treaty leaves this decision to the nations themselves. Member states are required to submit Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) every five years, and commit to increasing the ambition of their goals over time. INDCs are made available in a public registry maintained by the UNFCCC Secretariat. The commitments made, as well as the success of implementation, are subject to publicly available peer review. A periodic synthesis report shows whether the pledges made are sufficient to achieve the Paris Agreement goal. No pun- ishment is specified for states that fail to implement their INDCs. The accord has been described as simultaneously legally binding and voluntary—a balance of hard and soft law. The level of autonomy accorded to states was important to U.S. negotiators. Hoping to avoid the challenge faced by the Clinton administration, U.S. negotiators had worked to shape the accord so that it would not necessarily require Senate ratifica- tion. The Obama administration argued that all the legally bind- ing aspects of the agreement (largely reporting requirements) were already covered by the founding UNFCCC treaty, while the INDCs were self-designed and nonbinding. Breaking a Climate of Deadlock Although it remains to be seen if the Paris Agreement can effectively reduce emissions, it is nonetheless regarded as a rare success among climate negotiations in sustaining engagement of the parties. Climate negotiations have traditionally been fraught. Deadlock-producing disputes turn on complex technical issues, stark equity issues and problems with uncertainty. For example, upper atmosphere pollutants such as greenhouse gases (GHGs) can persist for centuries, so simply reducing emissions proves insufficient to repair the damage already done. This creates a dispute about how to compare the “differentiated responsibili- Celebrating adoption of the Paris Agreement at the United Nations Climate Change Conference of Parties 21 of Dec. 12, 2015, in Paris. From right to left: French President Francois Hollande, French Foreign Minister and President of COP 21 Laurent Fabius, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and Executive Secretary of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Christiana Figueres. ARNAUDBOUISSOU