The Foreign Service Journal, October 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2021 37 ties” of a traditional polluter, such as the United States, which currently produces about 15 percent of daily global emissions (but has been emitting for centuries) to those of China, which is a relative newcomer to high GHG levels but is currently produc- ing 30 percent of daily global emissions. This challenge is compounded by the centrality of fossil fuels to industrialization. Industrializing countries are eager to catch up economically, and they lack confidence that it is possible to “rise” without emissions rising as well. There is fear that lack of access to funding for electricity development will condemn poor countries to darkness. The centrality of energy to the global economy is troubling for all states: The IPCC estimates that 55 percent of global GHG emissions are directly connected to energy use, so how to maintain—much less expand—standards of living in a GHG-constrained environment is a grave concern. An even broader equity issue bedeviled the negotiations of every COP: The very fact that 197 countries had signed the UNFCCC meant that all would be included in the negotiations, even though the volume of emissions, the effect of climate change and the capacity of states varied dramatically among countries. Negotiations involving more than 190 countries on a scientifically complex, economically challenging issue led to prioritization problems: OPEC nations, for example, wanted to ensure that they would be assisted if a transition away from fossil fuels dramatically reduced their national wealth. Nations with skeptical populations wanted more research to prove origins of the problem. Agricultural nations wanted to ensure that they received appropriate credit for carbon-sequestering crops. Small island nations sought assurances that their populations would be accepted as refugees if their homelands became uninhabit- able. In short, the issues were so many and varied that even good-faith negotiators could not agree on priorities. Annex II (developing) countries had no obligation to reduce emissions under the early treaties. The Group of 77, fearful that pressure might grow in the future on developing countries to curb emissions and thereby potentially limit their own growth, compelled removal from the Kyoto Protocol of an article that detailed how a non-Annex I country might take on a voluntary commitment. (Argentina attempted to take on a commitment but was unable to do so; and Kazakhstan, which tried to gain membership in Annex I, struggled from COP 4 to COP 7 to achieve that laudable goal.) Eager to find a way to move forward, the Obama administra- tion concluded that, although meetings involving all the parties were essential, setting the table bilaterally would increase the prospects for success. Since China and the United States were the top emitters, the administration sought bilateral agreement. China, although it had long considered climate change a devel- oped world problem, had begun to shift its narrative in 2009, when it promised at the COP 15 to reduce the energy intensity of its economy and expand the use of nonfossil fuels. According to scholar Miranda Schreurs, this shift likely reflected China’s struggles with air quality, its dramatic increase in energy imports and its rising per-capita energy consumption. Xi Jinping proved a willing partner with Obama, and in November 2014 they released a “U.S.-China Joint Announce- ment on Climate Change and Energy Cooperation.” The announcement explicitly embraced the idea of INDCs and sketched out what would be included in the U.S. and the China plans. The promised actions were criticized for their modest ambition, but the model of stating intended contributions was brought to Paris with the full endorsement of the top two emit- ters, paving the way for a breakthrough. This effort was further amplified by the European Union. Long a supporter of binding international commitments, the E.U. announced its ambitious new 2030 emissions reduction target just prior to the 2014 U.S.-China summit. Attempting to set an example, the E.U. announced ambitious targets of 40 percent GHG reductions by 2030, combined with a 27 percent increase in renewable energy and a 27 percent increase in energy efficiency of GDP. Their specification of a target together with renewable and efficiency contributions were mirrored in China’s announcement. Since China, the United States and the European Union constitute the top emitters (accounting for 54 percent of global emissions according to the Environmental Protection Agency), a climate strategy supported by these three solidified Paris’ new direction. Polylateralism: Enter the Nonstate Actors The 2015 Paris negotiations, like all the COPs before them, attracted participation from interested nonstate actors. The Paris Agreement structure, however, was the first to create an explicit role for them. The treaty was signed and ratified by sovereign states, but Article 6.4 calls for signatories to encourage public and private entities. Nonstate actors have no obligation under The accord has been described as simultaneously legally binding and voluntary— a balance of hard and soft law.