The Foreign Service Journal, October 2022

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2022 25 The United States should designate Ukraine as a major ally, even as Ukraine continues to apply and work toward NATO membership. the United States and Great Britain) that their security, sover- eignty, and territorial integrity would be respected. In 2014 and further in 2022, the Russians totally violated that commitment. Ukrainian security could be assured by NATO membership— indeed, NATO leaders promised in 2008 that Ukraine would someday be a member—but that probably won’t happen soon. President Biden said that the U.S. goal was for “a demo- cratic, independent, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself from further aggression ” (emphasis added). He could accomplish that by committing to provide Ukraine with state-of-the-art weapons, now and in the future, that would deter Russia from further invasion. This is how the United States assures Israeli security—not through a mutual defense treaty, but in the form of a bilateral memo- randum of understanding (MOU) that commits steady funding for advanced weapons over time. The current version of that MOU commits the United States to provide Israel $38 billion for weapons over 10 years. Another lesson from the U.S.-Israel relationship is the value of Israel’s status as a major U.S. ally. The United States should desig- nate Ukraine as a major ally, even as Ukraine continues to apply and work toward NATOmembership. For now, being a major non-NATO ally would confer political status that would send a message to Moscow. Second, the United States should continue to lead the interna- tional coalition it has assembled to support Ukrainian sovereignty and oppose Russian aggression. This coalition—consisting of North American, European, and Far Eastern democracies that account for half of the world’s economic output—has united to impose sanctions on Russia, provide financial and military assis- tance to Ukraine, and hold Russia accountable for its crimes. On negotiations, the United States needs to reaffirm our view that Ukraine should enter negotiations only when Ukrainians decide the time is right. The timing, venue, and substance of any negotiations are up to Ukraine, not anyone else. That said, the United States should be willing to negotiate with Russia—separate from, but possibly in parallel with, Ukrainian-Russian talks—on reciprocal steps that would improve the security of both the United States and Russia. This could include discussions on the placement of nuclear weapons, for example, or with NATO on transparency of military exercises in Europe and European Russia. Finally, the United States should reinforce Ukrainians politi- cally as they consider negotiations by stating the U.S. intention to keep economic sanctions and export controls on Russia in place, at least until Moscow withdraws completely fromUkraine’s inter- nationally recognized territory, including Crimea and Donbas. What could a peace look like? The Ukrainians have made clear that a sustainable, endur- ing peace is not possible until Russia withdraws from sovereign, internationally recognized Ukrainian territory. If Putin tries to occupy parts of Ukraine before an agreement, his occupa- tion forces will suffer grievously. Russian forces and proxies are already getting a taste of partisan warfare in currently occupied Kherson. Peace could come in stages. Once Russian forces are pushed back to dispositions of Feb. 23, negotiations can begin. President Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people will decide what to agree on with the Russians. If those negotiations do not yield a final peace treaty—and the Ukrainians would be justified in not putting much faith in any document signed with the Russians, as dis- cussed above—there are precedents for how free Ukraine could develop: West Germany and South Korea. Yes, the analogies are inexact; U.S. forces guaranteed West German and South Korean security while they developed strong economies and democra- cies. But free Ukraine, with some form of security guarantee from the United States and the West, could develop economically and democratically, even while it worked over time to regain its ter- ritories. Ukrainians will not cede their territory to Russia and will work to regain it, no matter how long that takes. What about NATO expansion? Let me say four things about NATO expansion. First, if NATO had not admitted Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in the 1990s and Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania after that, Russia would be invading them today instead of Ukraine. Second, if NATO had accepted Ukraine and Georgia’s appli- cations for membership action plans in 2008, Russia would not have invaded Georgia four months later, or Ukraine six years later and today. Third, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has finally made clear to the world, especially formerly neutral Finland and