The Foreign Service Journal, November 2003

his troubleshooter/special negotiator roles. He achieved his greatest success in resolving the 1965-66 crisis in the Dominican Republic after other envoys of the United States and the Organization of American States had failed. The settlement he worked out rescued the Johnson administration from a major foreign policy embarrassment that was damaging U.S. interests throughout the hemisphere. It also produced changes in the Caribbean republic that proved of lasting bene- fit to the Dominican people. Few American statesmen other than Bunker had the originality and sensi- tivity required to fashion the terms of a settlement that the contentious Dominican rivals would accept. And almost none enjoyed a standing at the White House sufficient to tackle the problem largely free of the outside interference that could otherwise have impaired the negotiating process. Bunker lucidly spelled out and, in the Dominican Republic and else- where, personally practiced the principles a good negotiator should follow. These largely conformed to the maxims set out by classic com- mentators on Western diplomatic practice as updated to take account of 20th-century political changes. Although Bunker held that every negotiation is different, several com- mon techniques stand out in his third-party and bilateral efforts. The most distinctive hallmark of a Bunker-led negotiation was his tactic of creating an informal atmosphere in which the contending parties could develop easier personal rela- tions, preferably in a pleasant and secluded setting. Another was his practice of putting forward early in the negotiating process a set of draft proposals that became the terms of reference for the bargaining that fol- lowed. The teams he set up to assist him were somewhat unusual in American diplomacy. They were almost always small so that they could move swiftly and decisively to develop fresh approaches before others could second-guess them. Despite the importance top officials in Washington attached to the issues Bunker dealt with, he enjoyed a remarkable degree of independence in developing tactics and strategy in his negotiations. The confidence of the White House was a great boon to him, helping to restrain the bureaucracy from its normal penchant to micro-manage negotiations. Only in the Panama Canal negotiations did he become more involved in bureaucratic infighting. But given the stakes, the large number of powerful actors involved, and the sharp differences of view on this highly emotional national issue, that was inevitable. He proved himself adept both in dealing with the bureaucracy and then, in a new role in his diplomatic experience, in selling the treaties he had negotiated to Congress and the American people. N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 39 Bunker initially viewed the Buenos Aires embassy as a brief stop on the way to a quiet, retired life, not as the start of a full-fledged, highly distinguished second career in public service.