The Foreign Service Journal, November 2004

bers, but the enlarged alliance is not stronger because of it. It goes through the motions of security con- sultations and defense cooperation, but the reality is that NATO, as a uni- fied community, has been hollowed out. Its political cohesion has van- ished. Its military utility has been demonstrated in the Balkans and else- where, but in Washington that utility is seen in terms of a follow-up police force rather than as a full partner at the cutting edge of military actions. The disparity in defense spending is one reason for this, but not the only one. A preference for total control by the United States is another. Americans who favor an American- imposed international order have little use for transatlantic unity. Former government officials, now commenta- tors, Richard Perle and David Frum, have criticized Secretary of State Colin Powell and the first President Bush’s national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, for their “nostalgia for the alliances of the Cold War.” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has talked about “the New Europe,” those nations of Eastern Europe who are more ready to accept an American- imposed international order than are the old allies of Western Europe. He has also said that “the mission defines the coalition,” thus turning his back on the solidarity that was NATO’s price- less contribution to world order for half a century. The paradox is that, while exalting the American commitment to spread- ing democratic values, these Americans scorn the rule of law — the bedrock of democracy — and ridicule the international organiza- tions which enable nations to work together in the cause of peace and security. They disdain international- ists like Kofi Annan who remind us that “those who seek to bestow legiti- macy must themselves embody it; and those who invoke international law must themselves submit to it.” Perle and Frum have referred to interna- tional law, the United Nations, and even the normal method of discourse among nations — diplomacy — as “exploded illusions about the way the world should work.” The transatlantic rift will never be closed if these views prevail in the United States. Fortunately, the American people have historically favored alliances and the rule of law as their preferred way of interacting with other states. They still do. This basic predisposition is strengthened by the cultural affinity between the democratic nations of the West. To be sure, there are differences, but the similarities are dominant. They rein- force the idea of community. The European Problem NATO’s confusion about its com- mon goal is in danger of being repli- cated by the European Union. But the root cause there is different. The debate between widening and deep- ening the E.U. was resolved in favor of doing both — a balancing act that has proven much more difficult than expected. It is becoming clear that taking in more members requires a change in the governance of the orga- nization — namely, more reliance on majority voting on certain types of issues. If the member-states cannot pass that test of their commitment to a united Europe, the outcome is like- ly to be a tightly integrated inner core 50 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 4 Addressing the problem of internal conflicts requires an organization like the United Nations.