The Foreign Service Journal, November 2006

ruption and conflict. A U.S.-led multinational force entered the country under U.N. auspices in 1994, effectively ousting the leader of a military junta, Raoul Cedras, and restoring democrati- cally elected Jean-Bertrand Aris- tide to the presidency. The next year the United States turned over peacekeeping duties to the U.N., which emphasized police training and other democracy- building measures in successive missions that lasted until 2001. Washington also continued to provide an average of $100 million per year in economic and security assis- tance to Haiti over that period, according to the Congressional Research Service. But despite a brief period of calm and economic reforms under President René Préval from 1996 to 2000, Haiti’s political institu- tions remained dysfunctional. Aristide returned to the presidency in 2001 under a disputed vote, and the political and security situation worsened. He later fled into exile, facing armed rebellion and pressure to resign from Washington. In 2004, once again, U.S. forces took part in an international force that helped stablize the country. A new U.N. mission also arrived to guide the country to elections, restore order and “foster democratic governance.” Préval was re-elected president early in 2006, pledg- ing to revive efforts at economic and political reform. A U.N. force of more than 8,000 is in the country, but it is not yet clear whether it is more intent on peacekeeping or peacebuilding. (See p. 45.) The New U.N. Peacebuilding Commission Volumes have been written by various U.N. depart- ments about the pitfalls of nationbuilding. But despite constant demand for its services, the organization until now has been forced to deal with each mission in a most- ly ad hoc manner. The creation of a new U.N. Peace- building Commission earlier this year reflects the wide- spread belief among members that the organization must provide sustained support beyond the tours of the U.N. blue helmets. The 31-member commission, which held its inaugur- al session in June, is an advisory body intended to coordi- nate resources for patient, long-term development of countries emerging from conflict. It aims to bring together sectors of the United Nations that work on post-conflict reconstruction. East Timor and Haiti would appear to be priority clients for the commission. However, the first cases referred to it were Burundi and Sierra Leone. Although they need considerable help, the two African states are seen as having made steady progress in moving beyond their civil conflicts, and thus present two man- ageable cases for the commission to start off with. The concern is that the commission is an advisory body, as opposed to an operational one, and is dependent on vol- untary contributions, meaning nationbuilding efforts will remain subject to the whims of a Security Council and major donors, who all have short attention spans. Yet among its expected critical donors is the United States, which counts the creation of the commission as one of the few concrete results of the U.N. reform process of the past year. Lessons Learned (and Not) The formation of the Peacebuilding Commission is an important acknowledgment by the U.N.’s membership of longstanding institutional gaps that have impaired post- conflict efforts. The formal joining of development, political and security experts in this body is considered a prerequisite for developing sound nationbuilding strate- gies. The U.N. peacekeeping experience of the last two decades, with its appalling failures as well as quieter suc- cesses, has produced this consensus and other lessons. The lessons start with the need for “clear, credible and achievable mandates” from the U.N. Security Council, in the words of a much-discussed 2000 report from a panel headed by veteran U.N. diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi. Among the many missteps in Somalia, for example, was a problem of mission creep on the part of both U.N. and U.S. forces. Having achieved a humanitarian success, they ended up getting embroiled in a disastrous hunt for a warlord. Today’s many U.N. missions, whatever their failings, are rarely accused of overreaching. The organization has also clearly learned the impor- tance of getting combatants disarmed and reintegrated back into society as soon as possible. The success of the F O C U S 28 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 6 The Timorese experience should be especially meaningful for U.N. officials involved in moving Kosovo to a “final status” that may be independence.