The Foreign Service Journal, November 2006

stances. Not only did Somaliland have broad international recogni- tion (if only for five days) when granted its independence from Great Britain in 1961, but its sub- sequent union with the former Italian Somaliland was never legitimated by a promised refer- endum. In addition, it is claiming sovereignty within its former colonial boundaries — the touchstone principle of A.U. policies regarding national boundaries throughout the continent. (Unlike Puntland, which claims to encompass areas settled by the Darod clan, the Somaliland “state” is not defined by its clan composition.) The A.U. took a step in the direction of recognizing these factors as relevant when a 2005 fact- finding mission stated that Somaliland had a “politically unique” claim to recognition, one that would not open the door to other secessionist claims. The fact that Somaliland has politically unique charac- teristics does not mean there are no relevant lessons to be drawn from other cases of de facto, breakaway states, however. The main lesson to be drawn is that govern- ments of sovereign states who reject secessionist demands can no longer take international support for granted. Kosovo is a case in point, having taken a giant step toward independence on Oct. 24, 2005, when the U.N. Security Council endorsed the start of talks on its “end status.” As the province’s administrative authority, the U.N. has organized and run elections that clearly only deep- ened the commitment of the Albanian-majority popula- tion to becoming independent of Belgrade — as have, for all the differences of status, the internationally monitored and assisted elections in Somaliland. By 2006, Kosovo’s drive for independence had progressed to the point that a February report by the International Crisis Group assessed as very unlikely prospects that any Serbian gov- ernment will “voluntarily acquiesce to the kind of inde- pendence ... necessary for a stable, long-term solution.” The ICG recommends that even without Serbian acqui- escence, the U.N. impose a “conditional independence package” so long as Kosovo’s Albanians have made con- scientious efforts to offer minorities a range of protec- tions and guarantees. Montenegrin independence is another example. Far from working to keep Serbia and Montenegro in a feder- al union, the E.U. made a prece- dent-setting agreement to start negotiating entry with Montene- gro on a separate track from Serbia, anticipating that Montene- gro would be able to satisfy E.U. requirements faster than Serbia. Part of the explicit justification for a two-track policy was that Serbia- Montenegro’s federal-level institutions were too weak to be able to develop and enforce the necessary laws and reg- ulations. Also changing is the idea that with enough interna- tional support and pressure, weak federal solutions to fracturing states will eventually firm up into an endur- ing political order. Even the cheering for a Bosnia that now, after 11 years of international tutelage, has just begun to develop national institutions may be prema- ture. Or, to take an even more obvious example, developing strong federal-level institutions in the Iraqi federation looks to be the most problematic case of all. One would not want to push analogies between Kosovo, in particular, and Somaliland too far, of course. Kosovo is an international protectorate whose security is guaranteed by international military forces. There are U.N. resolutions that clearly admit an outcome of international recognition of a sovereign Kosovo. The incentive of European Union membership at the end of the road is keeping negotiations on track and has trumped Serbian intransigence. Conversely, there is no protection net for Somalia; no cavalry will come to its rescue. A Model, Not a Road Map The international community may exert pressure on the new regime in Mogadishu to resolve its issues with Somaliland peacefully, but is unlikely to do much if the ICU refuses — which it almost certainly will. Even with a (weakly enforced) U.N. arms embargo in place — and the current one is not being enforced by the African Union — the central government retains the means to instigate destabilizing acts in Somaliland. Furthermore, the parties in the south have not yet agreed to pursue a federal solution; only the ICU wants to reintegrate Somaliland into a unitary state. On the other side, the deepening of democracy in Somaliland is only likely to lead to a strengthening of its commit- F O C U S 36 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 6 The U.S. position has long been that the Somalis themselves should resolve the status question.