The Foreign Service Journal, November 2006

but prevented other industrial sectors from leveraging its success. Despite the negative consequences for Haiti, the donor community and the international financial institu- tions continued to advocate export assembly for Haiti until the country could expand its infrastructure, educate its labor force and diversify its industry. Yet these same governments and institutions were aware that Haiti’s rul- ing elite and dictatorial governments were unlikely to implement policies that would achieve broader economic and social development. Even after the U.S.-led intervention in 1994, Haiti’s economy actually shrank, while its transportation and communication infrastructure and natural environment deteriorated. In part, this was the result of ruinous agri- cultural trade policies that destroyed Haiti’s successful small farmers who produced exports of rice, pork and chicken. Haiti became a net importer of agricultural products, creating food insecurity and malnutrition for the majority of its people. At the same time, ownership of wealth became concentrated in a smaller percentage of the population. In 2002, the top 4 percent of the popula- tion controlled 66 percent of the country’s assets. Institutions Need Strengthening To end the tradition of presidential succession by seri- al coups, Pres. Préval will have to strengthen the parlia- ment, government ministries and civil society so these institutions can both complement and balance the power of the presidency. Parliament will require technical assis- tance and training from donor countries, both because many of its new members are entering public service for the first time and because the institution needs physical refurbishing after years of neglect and damage. Préval also needs to reinforce the role of political par- ties and cultivate a culture of compromise by fostering an open debate on the future of the country. This will require a formal political dialogue conducted through the media and in institutional channels, without resorting to strong-arm tactics. Préval has appointed representatives from a broad spectrum of political groups and appears ready to reach beyond his own party for support. So far, however, he has been characteristically cautious in his approach to governance. He has postponed decisions and not acted in a manner that would create winners and losers. His government’s five-year proposal for interna- tional support resulted in larger than requested commit- ments from international donors. However, Préval has not dealt effectively with the challenge from heavily- armed gangs that remain a major threat to security in Port-au-Prince and other important cities. In the near term, he will need to address the major issues facing Haiti, including poverty, drug trafficking, corruption, the role of former soldiers and the gang problem. Haiti’s new leader will also have to establish local gov- ernments that are capable of providing services to the majority of the population that lives in rural areas. Decentralizing the responsibilities of the government to localities will shift the burden from the executive branch by locating authority and resources closer to the people. The new government should harness Haitian civil society and encourage it to fill the gaps in government capacity. Over the course of the last two decades, almost all civic associations — community, peasant, youth and business organizations — have been adversely affected. Winning back the confidence and restoring the vitality of civil soci- ety will be critical to the nation’s political future. To encourage public trust, Préval must ensure that his actions are as transparent as possible. Reforming Haiti’s political traditions and institutions will not be easy, for the political situation remains tenuous. Préval’s Lespwa Party holds only 11 of 30 Senate seats and 21 out of 97 deputy seats, far from a majority in either chamber of parliament. Progress on a range of sensitive issues will require a spirit of compromise, which has not been the tradition in Haitian politics. Former President Aristide could become a destabilizing factor if he attempts to return to Haiti from exile in South Africa before condi- tions warrant. Fortunately, there has been little public manifestation of support for Aristide’s return beyond small street demonstrations that were held this spring to mark the anniversary of his 2004 departure from Haiti. Politics could become more fractious in the near term, particularly as popular expectations are frustrated by the government’s inevitable inability to quickly satisfy a broad range of demands. The Challenge of Stabilization Assuring stability will also be a challenge. The 8,700 soldiers and police of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti are the only coherent security forces in the coun- try. MINUSTAH has demonstrated the ability to main- tain order in Port-au-Prince and the willingness to use armed force against disruptive elements. Already 12 F O C U S 48 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 6