The Foreign Service Journal, November 2006

U.N. soldiers and three U.N. police officers have been killed in the line of duty. However, those forces are insufficient to provide security in the many parts of the country outside gov- ernment control. Nor have the peacekeepers implemented an effective disarmament, demobi- lization and reintegration pro- gram to remove the threat posed by former soldiers, or dealt effectively with the armed gangs that control urban slums and the isolated ports that are used for the transshipment of narcotics from South America. The U.N. has also failed to reform and reconstitute the Haitian National Police, the country’s only security force, or improve the judicial and penal systems, which are essential for the rule of law. U.N. police have determined that only 4,600 of the 8,000 Haitian offi- cers on the police rolls are currently serving, and many of those are guilty of criminal offenses and abuse of human rights. Political manipulation, corruption and involvement in narcotics trafficking have tarnished the image of the HNP and limited its effectiveness. The U.N. is working on a comprehensive plan for police development, but effective implementation will require buy-in from the Préval government and gener- ous support from the donor community. Making mat- ters worse, the Haitian justice system remains corrupt and dysfunctional; the penal system is notorious for abuse and the indefinite incarceration of prisoners without trial. Increased U.S. assistance will be focused on strength- ening Haiti’s security sector through vetting, retraining and reforming the police. More is needed, however. In 1994, the U.S. teamed up with Canada and France to train and equip a 5,000-member Haitian police force in just one year. This needs to be done again. New U.S. assistance will also focus on improving the effectiveness of Haitian courts and reducing pre-trial detention. However, the U.S. needs to develop a comprehensive program for police and judicial training and reform — including international mentoring — over an extended term. Without such a comprehensive and sustained effort, the Préval government will not be able to estab- lish the rule of law. A Dialogue on Assistance Levels In pursuing its political and security objectives, the Préval government will be helped by the fact that the international finan- cial institutions and the major donor countries appear to have learned from previous experi- ence, and intend to engage the Haitians in a discussion of priori- ties for development assistance. The international com- munity also appears determined to stay for the long term and not to repeat the mistake of withdrawing before reforms take root and the Haitians can sustain innovations on their own. Emphasis in most programs will be on capacity-building, to overcome the critical lack of physi- cal infrastructure and human capital. Below a thin veneer of world-class professionals, most Haitian institu- tions lack the appropriately educated and technically skilled manpower to operate modern systems for man- agement and administration of government programs. The Préval administration has requested international assistance for quick-impact public works projects to pro- vide employment and suppress violence in Haiti’s poorest slums and depressed rural areas. It has also indicated an interest in pursuing development in tourism, light indus- try and agriculture. As a result, USAID is concentrating on dual priorities: stability and growth. It will support Préval’s request for funding to create 200,000 short-term, public works jobs in slums and other underserved areas, and to rebuild towns and villages that were devastated by Tropical Storm Jeanne in September 2004. USAID will also work to improve the government’s ability at both the national and local level to plan, manage and deliver basic services over the long term. In administering aid, it will be challenging for USAID and other donors to alter the habit of working through nongovernmental organizations, a practice developed to avoid inept or corrupt Haitian government agencies. Working through the Haitian government will be more difficult, costly and time-consuming than going it alone, but doing so will be essential to insure sustainability. Haiti’s new government may also profit from the energy and talents of the Haitian diaspora, if it engages this diverse community in a common effort to move the country forward. Last year, remittances from Haitians F O C U S N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 49 Winning back the confidence and restoring the vitality of civil society will be critical to the nation’s political future.