The Foreign Service Journal, November 2006

extremely poor track record in this regard, and it is far from clear that S/CRS can reverse the lessons of history. The scholarly work on nationbuilding illuminates both the costs and the true nature of a broad policy of “fixing” failed states. In 2003, retired diplomats James R. Hooper and Paul R. Williams argued for what they called “earned sovereignty,” the idea being that target states would need to climb back into the good graces of the intervening power to regain their sovereignty. In some cases, that would take the form of “shared sovereignty,” in which domestic governments would performwhatever functions were allowed by the intervener, but other duties would be retained by the outside actor. The duration of shared sov- ereignty varies. “In some instances,” Hooper and Williams explain, “it may be indefinite and subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions as opposed to specified timelines.” The premise seems to be that countries will be returned to the control of their indigenous populations when the intervener decides it is appropriate. Neocolonial Logic Stanford political scientists James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin dispense with rhetorical niceties, calling explicitly for “postmodern imperialism.” Under a straight- forwardly neocolonial model, “the search for an exit strat- egy is delusional,” they explain, particularly with respect to returning “control of domestic security to local authorities by a certain date in the near future.” To the contrary, in some cases a complete exit by the interveners may never be possible; rather, the endgame is “to make the national level of government irrelevant for people in comparison to the local and supranational levels.” Thus, in Fearon and Laitin’s model, nationbuilding may not be an appropriate term: a better label would perhaps be nation- ending , replacing national governments with a supranational gov- erning order. Evidently the nation-state then withers away and dies. For his part, Krasner believes that the “rules of con- ventional sovereignty ... no longer work.” Writing in 2004, he called instead for an approach to failed states that would involve “alternative institutional arrangements sup- ported by external actors, such as de facto trusteeships and shared sovereignty.” The implications of those poli- cies are clear. As Krasner states: “In a trusteeship, inter- national actors would assume control over local functions for an indefinite period of time. They might also elimi- nate the international legal sovereignty of the entity or control treaty-making powers. ... There would be no assumption of a withdrawal in the short or medium term.” This hearkens back to Woodrow Wilson’s advocacy of trusteeships in the wake of World War I in order to “build up in as short a time as possible ... a political unit that can take charge of its own affairs” — without, however, the pretense of “as short a time as possible.” Although most Americans support sovereignty and reject the logic of neocolonialism, avowed advocates of empire have not hidden their pleasure at the creation of S/CRS. In advancing the case for an American colonial office, Max Boot, author and senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, noted that “of course, [a colonial office] cannot be called that. It needs an anodyne euphemism such as ‘Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.’ ” Boot later elaborated: “The United States needs its own ver- sion of the British Colonial Office for the post-imperial age,” and the decision to establish S/CRS is “a good start.” If the costs of successfully administering foreign coun- tries were low and the prospects for success high, it might make sense to try. However, a look at what it takes to “get nationbuilding right” demonstrates that the costs of mak- ing it a core object of U.S. foreign policy — as envisioned by the advocates of S/CRS — would greatly outweigh any benefits. The Costs of Nationbuilding Security is a paramount concern in every stabilization and reconstruction mission. By definition, the target state will be emerging from conflict or collapse, and adminis- trators will need to be protected from violence and intim- idation as they initiate and implement S&R programs. In nearly all instances, the U.S. military would have to per- form these security functions. But how many troops does it take to support an S&R mission? What types of troops? And how long will they have to stay? The answers based on the historical record are not heartening. One of the best estimates regarding the mili- tary requirements of post-conflict missions comes from the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board. A DSB study from December 2004 that assessed nationbuilding opera- tions over the past two millennia highlights some sobering facts: “Stabilization operations can be very labor-inten- sive. ... The United States will sometimes have ambitious goals for transforming a society in a conflicted environ- F O C U S 54 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 6