The Foreign Service Journal, November 2008

Balkan mentality correctly, for she assumed that the Yugoslavs would be satisfied with retaining Zone B. In- stead, a serious crisis erupted, with troops on each side of the border ready to confront each other, both (ironically) supplied by the United States. So State came up with a new strat- egy. Since the Italians and Yugoslavs refused to negotiate directly, the “occupying” forces — the U.S., Bri- tain and Yugoslavia — would negoti- ate a solution on their behalf. The Italians, inferring an American and British predisposition to their side, did not object. Nor did the Yugoslavs, happy the Italians were not included. The talks were to start in London in January 1954, but in secret, to avoid another public failure. The Yugoslavs appointed Vladimir Velebit, a Tries- tino, as their representative. Geoffrey W. Harrison, assistant under-secretary of state in the British Foreign Office, would negotiate for the British. Julius Holmes, who was on assignment at the European Desk at State and had been embroiled in the debates over Trieste for years, was the logical per- son to represent the United States. But his candidacy was rejected because he was being investigated by the Justice Department for alleged financial wrongdoing linked to surplus ship transactions. Holmes’ problems were known only to a few, so Thompson’s appointment to head the talks came as a surprise, given the fact that he was already fully occupied as chief of mission in Vienna. Thompson went home to break the news to his wife, who was preg- nant. He genuinely, but erroneously, believed he was a placeholder and that his assignment would last a few weeks or a month. Luckily, he had a strong staff in Vienna headed by a very able deputy chief of mission, Charles Yost, whom he trusted com- pletely. The unusually close sense of teamwork that developed there has been attested to by many. Thompson left Vienna on Jan. 22, 1954, for Washington, just after his daughter Sherry was born — suppos- edly for briefings on Austria. Then it was on to London, ostensibly to buy clothes. He went on “buying clothes” until the following October! Thompson avidly followed news of the weight gain of his new daughter, along with the weight loss of her mother, by post. It was a difficult time to be apart, and they wrote constantly. Thompson complained in his let- ters home that London was expen- sive and cold. He had a lot of back- ground reading and “homework,” which he could only do under the bedcovers because it was so cold in his little room at the Connaught Hotel (not so posh as it is now). He could not contact anyone to keep his whereabouts secret, so he spent his free time wandering around the city window shopping, attending con- certs, going to horse races and solv- ing chess problems. He complained about the food, too; when the talks finally ended nine months later, this already lanky man had become almost skeletal. N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 61 The secrecy, trust and empathy Amb. Thompson demonstrated throughout the negotiations were the keys to cutting the Gordian knot. Photo: Amb. Thompson leaving Austrian State Treaty meeting in Vienna, 1955. Inset: Thompson receiving the Medal of Freedom from President Kennedy.