The Foreign Service Journal, November 2008

The Talks Begin Perhaps Thompson’s most impor- tant achievement in the negotiations was convincing both sides that he was an honest broker — not easy, follow- ing the October 8th Declaration. His instructions from Washington were, in his own words, “hopelessly lopsided in favour of Italy.” Taking advantage of Secretary Dulles’ presence in Paris, Thompson went to see him and was able to get his orders modified. Still, it took Thompson and Harrison more than two weeks to convince Velebit that “our interest was due to wider issues at stake and not just some maneuver in an Italian game.” The Importance of Secrecy. What might have been an inconse- quential dinner between Thompson and Velebit, colleagues from a previ- ous posting in Rome, changed the whole configuration and character of the talks. During a February 1954 dinner, the two men confided in each other enough for Thompson to tell Harrison that he had made more progress in those few hours than in all the previous days at the negotiating table. He realized that to get down to essentials, it was necessary to remove the audience. Thus, at his suggestion, all three principals dismissed their entire delegations so they could engage in frank discussions. In a twist on Woodrow Wilson’s dictum, Thompson maintained that “Open covenants are all right, but arriving at them openly is a poor way to achieve them.” And years later, he observed, “Our greatest weakness in diplomacy, in my opinion, is our inability to keep our mouths shut.” In the Other Man’s Shoes. Thompson knew that understanding the problems and tactics of the other side is essential to good negotiating, and he had already learned at Potsdam that one of the greatest requirements in dealing with the communists was patience. Because of the rigidity of their system, it was never wise to spring a new move on them or expect immediate answers. For the communists, the most important factor was to save face, and not necessarily to seek a mutually advantageous compromise. In the case of Trieste, offering the Yugoslavs predominantly Slavic hinterland terri- tory in exchange for predominantly Italian coastal towns seemed emi- nently reasonable, but it put Tito in an awkward position. Residents in the hinterland towns would move in order to stay in Italy and Yugoslav fishermen in the coastal towns would have to defect to Italy to access the sea in order to continue fishing. Recognizing it would be embar- rassing for the Yugoslavs to have an “exodus of people going into Italy,” Thompson offered a new deal to avoid this. He added solutions to port access, reparation payments and minority rights, intentionally creating an interdependence that ensured pro- fitable, long-term cooperation. Hole 9 Velebit did not want to reveal his government’s maximum position because he anticipated the Italians would make a counterproposal to whatever was brought forward. So he 62 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 8 Llewellyn Thompson’s life is a reminder of how much can be accomplished through quiet service to one’s country. Thompson (center) with President Dwight D. Eisenhower (left) and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 1958. Inset: Thompson (left) with Nikita Khrushchev and Moscow DCM Boris Klosson (right) at Spaso House.