The Foreign Service Journal, November 2008

suggested presenting something less grand to leave room for bargaining. Although Thompson had also pre- dicted the likelihood of a counterpro- posal, he argued against manipulating the Italians through deception. (In a talk Thompson would later give at the Foreign Service Institute to future diplomats on negotiating tactics, he said: “I would like to give one piece of advice which applies to all diplomacy as well as negotiation. … You will find it elaborated with great skill in Harold Nicholson’s writings and it may be summed up by saying that no matter whom you are dealing with, honesty is the best policy.”) The Yugoslavs then pressed for a guarantee that Washington and London would impose their solution on Italy, but Thompson would not give in on that, either. It was clear to him that they would, in effect, be pre- senting the Italians with a fait accom- pli that the Italians would not accept any more than the Yugoslavs would have. So he made it clear to Velebit they would have to present these con- cessions only as proposals. Having started out demanding the entire area of Trieste, including the city itself, the Yugoslavs had finally agreed to a division along the A/B Zone border, but with a slight adjust- ment on the northern side to encom- pass the town of Punta Sotille on the seashore, in favor of the Yugoslavs. In exchange, they would give Italy a comparable triangle of land in Zone B, which became known to the Western negotiators as the “rock pile” because it was an uninhabited rocky bit of land with no discernable redeeming value. When this and other proposals were taken to the Italians for approval, they reacted heatedly. Letting the Yugoslavs have Punta Sotille, which overlooked the Trieste port, would jeopardize the very exis- tence of the Italian government. The talks thus stalemated over a piece of land the Americans referred to as “Hole 9,” because the territory was not much bigger than the ninth green at the Chevy Chase Golf Club. U.S. Acting Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith commented that a minor concession on Trieste was in Yugoslavia’s own interest because it would lead to reparation payments by Rome of up to $30 million, “the most profitable real estate deal he had ever heard of.” Yet the Yugoslavs would not budge. Nor would the Italians. What finally removed the stum- bling block was simple ego massaging. Thompson had written early in the negotiations that a final gap was inevitable and that a direct, high-level appeal would be needed to bridge it. He now suggested this be expressed in a personal letter from Pres. Eisen- hower. Robert Murphy, an important diplomat and personal friend of the president, made the pilgrimage to see Tito, travelling not just to Belgrade but all the way to Brioni, where the leader was playing “hard to get.” The letter from Eisenhower made Tito feel that the president and great World War II general was talking to him as an equal, and in September 1954 Tito agreed to let the Italians have Punta Sotille in exchange for the “rock pile.” To avoid amending the Italian Peace Treaty signed at the end of World War II, this agreement remained a memorandum of under- standing until it was ratified in the Treaty of Osimo in 1975. Cutting the Gordian Knot The U.S. wanted regional stability, and the fact that the agreement lasted until 1975 attests to its success. But had all the months of quibbling really been necessary? Couldn’t Washing- ton and London simply have come up with a reasonable deal and made the two countries accept it? Not likely. The prospect of being forced to accept a diktat by the two Western powers was simply not feasi- ble, politically or personally, for either Yugoslavia or Italy. National and per- sonal egos would not have allowed it, and the region would have remained a potentially dangerous focus for con- flict. The negotiations’ general secrecy allowed the two countries to accept the U.S. and U.K. as brokers without having to consider national pride on a world stage. The private talks among Velebit, Harrison and Thompson, without their entourages as audience, allowed them to build trust and be honest with each other. And the abil- ity of each side to come to agreement without force and to claim victory saved face for everyone. In the end, the secrecy, trust and empathy our father demonstrated throughout the negotiations were the keys to cutting the Gordian knot. N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 63