The Foreign Service Journal, November 2009

N O V E M B E R 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 13 alistic nor practical. Our bilateral assistance program has always served U.S. political objectives, however short- sighted they may be, and will continue to do so. Any administration will insist upon this, so there is no getting away from it. But that does not mean that the program cannot also serve develop- ment objectives. I have managed large aid programs in countries of great political importance to the U.S. — Pakistan and the Democratic Re- public of the Congo (formerly Zaire), for example. The assistance we pro- vided to those countries at the time was meant to help achieve political objectives. But we used those re- sources to meet real development needs and carry out effective poverty alleviation projects: agricultural growth, health, roads, training, civic participation and the like. This pattern has been repeated in numerous countries; Egypt is a prime example. Usually there is no contra- diction or conflict between political and development objectives, so in my view the purists have exaggerated the scope of the problem. Those who want U.S. economic as- sistance to be used only for develop- ment purposes without any political content should push for greater contri- butions to the programs of the multi- lateral entities like theWorld Bank, the various regional banks and the United Nations. These institutions generally do not have political objectives, and Washington carries great weight in them. Yet only about a fourth or less of total U.S. economic development funds are channeled through them. Raising the multilateral percentage to one-third or more of total assistance might be a realistic objective. S P E A K I N G O U T We should not try to eliminate the aid spigots of other departments of government, which are important resources.