The Foreign Service Journal, November 2011

24 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / N O V E M B E R 2 0 1 1 The FY 2009 and FY 2010 staffing increases that achieved a 17-percent expansion of the Foreign Service were a remarkable accomplishment for Secretary Clinton, President Obama and Congress. Yet, with most of the new employees being sent out to fill existing vacant positions, FS staffing levels still fell far short of what was needed to fully restore America’s diplomatic and development capacity. In an August 2010 report to Congress, the State De- partment documented the need for 1,250 additional For- eign Service positions. The unmet needs included positions to staff strategic areas including Afghanistan, Pak- istan and the Middle East; increase training opportunities in foreign languages and professional education; expand public diplomacy outreach; and promote other vital na- tional interests overseas. Bear in mind that all of this was before the “Arab Spring” and other recent developments. The Obama administration’s FY 2011 budget request (forwarded to Congress in February 2010) sought 410 new Foreign Service positions at State and 200 at USAID. In February 2011 (after the 2010 congressional elections but before its FY 2011 request was acted on), the administra- tion submitted a FY 2012 request for an additional 150 Foreign Service positions at State and 165 at USAID. In April 2011 Congress passed an FY 2011 budget without any funds to hire additional State and USAID personnel above attrition. Currently, FY 2012 funding operates under a continu- ing resolution. Accordingly, the unmet request for For- eign Service staffing needs totals 560 at State and 365 at USAID. Additional needs would (in our judgment) in- crease those numbers further. The FAC report concludes that “Secretary Clinton has energetically and appropriately pressed for the resources necessary to give the United States the civilian tools it needs for conducting foreign relations in the 21st century.” Personally, I would add that this encomium applies only through the FY 2010 budget. It remains to be seen how successful Sec. Clinton will be in her final two years in the struggle for resources. I see some ominous signs, which I will discuss at the end of this summary. The QDDR and Development, Stabilization and Reconstruction In July 2009, Secretary Clinton announced that the State Department and USAID would conduct an inaugu- ral Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. The review’s goals were to: elaborate a strategic manage- ment plan with a practical and relevant time horizon; elicit clear, hard decisions about priorities; and ensure that these priorities were reflected in the budget’s allocation of re- sources. In short, the goal was to answer the question: How can we do better? Inevitably, the drafting of the QDDR was ensnarled in the 60-year-old debate between development practitioners pursing an independent USAID freed from foreign policy constraints and “whole of government” proponents advo- cating development as part of a broad diplomatic effort managed by ambassadors overseas and the Secretary of State in Washington. Whatever individual views on this matter might be, the reality is that the last three Secre- taries of State have worked for the integrated approach. It is now hard to visualize a future Secretary of State ced- ing responsibility for development to others. Additional factors in favor of the “whole of government” approach include the following: • Ambassadorial authorities. By statute (Public Law 96-465: the Foreign Service Act of 1980) and by presi- dential directive (the president’s letter to chiefs of mission), ambassadors have “full responsibility for the direction, co- ordination and supervision of all government employees in [the country of assignment].” Such authorities clearly include USAID missions at post. • The Mission Strategic Resource Plan. Annually, every embassy produces, or updates, anMSRP on a coun- try team basis which, of course, includes USAID inputs. • The budget process. These MSRPs are consoli- dated and regional priorities established in the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance at State and the Office of Budget and Resource Management at USAID. The re- gional plans are aggregated for the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and then go to the Secretary of State for final approval. The budget proposal for the 150 Account (International Affairs) then goes to the Office of Management and Budget, where it is consolidated with those of other agencies and submitted to Congress on a “whole of government” basis. • The congressional process. The Secretary of State defends the bulk of the administration’s submission of Chapter 150 of the national budget before each house of Congress. The reality of the U.S. debt crisis and the as- cendency of the Republican Party, at least in the House, have changed the political environment significantly. USAID would likley be more vulnerable to program re- ductions than it already is without the protection of the of- C OVER S TORY