The Foreign Service Journal, November 2012

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | NOVEMBER 2012 57 2011). His book includes a foreword from Ronald Neu- mann, a former ambassador to Afghanistan who is now president of the American Academy of Diplomacy. A String of Local Successes In the summer of 2010 Jason Katz, a U.S. Agency for International Develop- ment PRT representative, threw himself into four months of joint planning for a major clearing opera- tion in the upper Helmand River Valley (locally known as the Chutu). When Afghan commandos, a police auxil- iary and U.S. Special Forces finally launched a joint offensive that December, USAID was able to follow, literally, right behind the operation. Within two days after the fighting concluded, nearly a thousand local villagers, including ex-Taliban fighters, were already at work repair- ing a critical road along the river’s edge. By late January 2011, our forces had opened a route northward, to the isolated Forward Operating Base Tinsley (also known as FOB Cobra). We controlled both banks of the Helmand and were beginning to squeeze Taliban supply lines. Just as importantly, road travel was now possible all the way from the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt. A four-year Taliban blockade had been broken, and commerce boomed. American and Australian conventional forces, along with their Afghan counterparts, arrived. So, too, did PRT resources and personnel. The provincial government began establishing basic services, and the influence of the Taliban visibly waned. While this was largely a Special Operations success story, it demonstrated to those of us on the ground the benefits of harnessing opportunities as they arose. No master plan had dictated that we would work with the SOTF-SE on these programs, and no road map showed us the way for- ward. We simply adapted to changing circumstances and shifting political priorities. Similar examples of suc- cessful cooperation occurred all across Uruzgan. For instance, when Australian Foreign Ministry politi- cal officer Joel McGregor traveled to Gizab district, he lived and worked for two weeks with the resident Village Stability Operations representative (a U.S. Air Force officer) to resolve burgeoning tribal disputes. McGregor was able to carry back to the provincial capital a much better understand- ing of where the PRT’s efforts could be both productive and counterproductive. Another member of PRT Uruzgan, U.S. Department of Agriculture agronomist Stew Swanson, worked with the SOTF-SE civil affairs contingent to establish a horticultural training program. Swanson educated farmers in Uruzgan prov- ince and southern Dai Kundi on techniques for locally sustain- able farming. He also traveled on short notice to Zabul and Kandahar provinces to assist SOTF-SE efforts there. The list goes on and is too long to recount fully here. While all this was happening, though, something else happened: Bit by bit, SOTF-SE civil affairs officers and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Village Stability officers began contributing to PRT planning. We began integrating more fully our various goals and programs: women’s health, sustainable agriculture and good governance, to name but a few. PRT personnel regularly contended with opaque or critically delayed guidance on major political issues, security policies and evolving strategy. USDA adviser Stew Swanson lays hands on the crop. TedBurkhalter