The Foreign Service Journal, November 2012

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | NOVEMBER 2012 59 the country were violat- ing the rules almost daily to avoid being rendered immobile and ineffective. This situation led to a wink- wink, nod-nod culture up and down the chain of command (I have the sto- ries to back this up) and a consequent risk of security lapses. A truly effective security policy would set forth a short list of absolute prohibitions and a much larger list of guidelines to be followed where practicable. That said, those who consistently exercise bad judgment can and should be withdrawn, for they endanger not only themselves but those who might be sent to recover them. n Third, Mission Kabul’s senior leadership owes it to field personnel to fully understand and acknowledge the situations in which it is placing them. Our people have operated under extremely dangerous conditions, unarmed and poorly trained. One possibly apocryphal tale that has made the rounds: a newly arrived civilian with two full suitcases, an umbrella and no briefing is dropped by helicopter in a muddy field in Marja in early 2010. Before he can get his bearings, his Marine companions have taken off and are yelling at him from behind blown-out walls to “move his ass.” Sadly, the truth is not too far from that. Civilian personnel have become separated during firefights, have found themselves alone with armed Afghans, and have been involved in downed aircraft incidents. They have taken an active part in firefights, have driven through improvised explosive devices, have had their armored SUVs penetrated by rocket-propelled grenade rounds, and have been caught in violent prisoner escapes. While we must aggressively deploy civilians to all locations where they can be of use, including those that are dangerous, we must carefully select, train and then adequately arm those officers. n Fourth, overstaffing PRTs and so-called regional plat- forms does not enhance effectiveness. We will never be able to match the military’s manpower, and that is not where our strength is to be found in any event. (The civilian surge in Afghanistan was a grand political notion, but it was in many ways counterproductive.) Often, our small numbers give us the very nimbleness that we need to balance the military’s bureau- cratic juggernaut. n Fifth, as we shift from a PRT model to something more suited to a reduced military footprint, we should deploy field personnel as advisers to individual military elements—then let them determine precisely where civilians can be most useful. This will encourage initiative and bring bang for the buck. n Finally, as we wend our way toward military withdrawal, we should remain attuned to how we can help assure the success of those forces that, along with the U.S. diplomatic mis- sion, are likely to remain behind. Press reports and congres- sional testimony continue to indicate that Afghan Local Police units and Village Stability Operations personnel, along with their Special Operations implementers, will remain corner- stones of our efforts in Afghanistan beyond 2014. Reports of civilian-military frictions over these programs must, if true, be addressed. Postscript Since I first drafted this article earlier this year, much has changed—but much more has remained the same. The Afghan Local Police program continues to garner headlines, and many continue to see this inherently sensitive initiative as the back- bone of any future U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan. The need for highly adaptable, mobile civilian advisers remains acute, as does the importance of seconding the vast majority of those officials to field units, rather than command staffs. Concern over the safety of our civilian personnel—particu- larly in light of our recent losses in Libya—is stronger than ever, and this may continue to render us less effective than we might otherwise be. But I am happy to hear reports that Embassy Kabul and the State Department leadership have begun tack- ling the problem of “civilian surge” overstaffing. In the end, the well-intentioned bureaucracy we con- structed in Afghanistan hindered efforts in the field and severed the vital, direct relationship that field officers once enjoyed with the senior embassy leadership. Let us hope the current restructuring efforts end better. n As the surge recedes, the Afghan Local Police program may well be the backbone of any future U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan.