The Foreign Service Journal, November 2015

26 NOVEMBER 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL China. Technically speaking, China is not an Arctic nation. No part of China extends north of the Arctic Circle, and China does not have any territorial possessions in the Arctic. Yet Beijing has acted in ways that make its interest in the Arctic quite clear, both officially and unofficially. While urging the world to keep the Arctic outside the sovereignty of any one state, or group of states, China is simultaneously expanding its influence within the Arctic nations, particularly in Iceland and Norway. Huang Nubo, a Chinese businessman with strong ties to the country’s government, sought to purchase a large piece of land A Q&A with Special Representative for the Arctic Admiral Robert Papp 1. Do you feel that enough resources (money, staff, etc.) are provided to adequately address Arctic issues? In a resource-constrained environment, we have been fortunate that the State Department has directed sufficient resources to fulfill the requirements of a successful Arctic Council chairmanship. The administration has also looked for ways to elevate efforts in the Arctic across the government by standing up the Arctic Executive Steering Committee to coordinate and prioritize activities, making the most of resources in each department and agency. Further, during President Obama’s recent travels to Alaska, he committed resources to specific initiatives related to renewable energy, energy efficiency, coastal erosion, and safety and security in the Arctic. 2. Is the United States concerned about the Arctic plans of other nations, specifically Russia and China? At the current time, the sovereignty rights of the eight Arctic states are globally recognized and respected, and the United States has no immediate concerns with the Arctic plans of other nations. Although Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has strained its relations with the Arctic states and has complicated some of our work on Arctic issues, we continue to work with Russia through the Arctic Council and are maintaining activities related to protecting the Arctic environment, ensuring maritime safety and conducting law enforcement operations. China’s role as an observer in the Arctic Council enables China to be aware of issues that may affect the country’s interests, and provides a mechanism through which China can contribute to the work of the council. 3. Beyond climate change, what is the No. 1 strategic U.S. goal in the Arctic? President Obama and Secretary Kerry have both affirmed that a secure and well-managed Arctic marked by international cooperation is a key priority of the United States. The Arctic Executive Steering Committee, charged by executive order to prepare for a changing Arc- tic and to enhance coordination of national efforts, will implement a comprehensive and long-term vision for our Arctic engagement through the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. 4. Would a Senate-confirmed “Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs” help elevate the profile of Arctic issues? The establishment of a special representative position was an important step in demonstrating the State Department’s commitment to the Arctic and ensured visibility of Arctic issues at the highest levels of our government leading into the preparations for the Arctic Council chairmanship. With continued strong support from Secretary Kerry and President Obama, I am confident that I have the stature and authority to carry out my mission. 5. Would ratification of the UNCLOS treaty affect the way the United States is able to impact events in the Arctic? Joining the Law of the Sea Convention remains a top priority for this administration. Melting ice in the Arctic is creating new risks, opportunities and responsibilities. As a party to the convention, the United States can best protect the navigational freedoms enshrined in the convention and fully secure its sovereign rights to the vast resources of our continental shelf beyond 200 miles from shore. —Ásgeir Sigfússon in Iceland (where his request was rejected) and Norway, where he successfully acquired a sizeable tract close to the northern city of Tromsø. While Huang denies that he is acting on behalf of Beijing, many see the hand of the Communist Party in these dealings. In Iceland, the Chinese embassy has quickly become the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavík and Iceland-China ties are rapidly expanding. China’s main interests in the Arctic appear to be threefold: curbing Russia’s influence in the region; securing access to the shipping route north of Russia for shorter shipping times to