The Foreign Service Journal, November 2015

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | NOVEMBER 2015 63 ing remarks generated public sentiment that pressured foreign governments to accept tough concessions on arms limitation. One observer commented that Hughes had spoken “not to the delegates assembled in Continental Hall, but to the whole world to focus public opinion before anyone else had a chance to play with it.” After his speech, the Washington Naval Conference adjourned for three days, and during the recess Hughes’ words flew around the globe. Japanese correspondents cabled his entire speech to Tokyo at the cost of $1.50 a word. The London Daily Chronicle declared that the “world is in debt to the United States government for its broad humanity and incisive vigor.” Contemporary accounts extol Hughes’ powers of concentra- tion. He could memorize a speech after reading it a few times. In the months leading up to the Washington Naval Conference, he carefully studied naval data and mastered technical ques- tions concerning tonnage, expenditures and armaments. He had understood that successful arms limitation could not focus on the naval needs of each power—a recipe for limitless expendi- tures that would not increase international security—but instead should focus on a proportionate reduction of the relative naval strength of each country. With that in mind, Hughes devised a capital-ship ratio among the five powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France and Italy—that guided the course of the negotiations. Diplomatic wrangling over the details of the agreement lasted 12 weeks, with Hughes and other delegates forced to make tough compromises. Due to French recalcitrance, Hughes was unable to extend the limitations on naval armaments to smaller vessels. But he succeeded where no one else had before: The world had its first arms control agreement. Promoting Institutional Reform Disarray at the State Department was another problem that confronted Hughes immediately. The department had been in urgent need of reform after drifting under Bainbridge Colby, President Wilson’s last Secretary of State. One of Hughes’ prede- cessors, Elihu Root, described the department as “in the condi- tion of a virtual coma.” Secretary Hughes threw his characteristic energy into insti- tutional reform. “Every American should feel ashamed that any country in the world should have a better diplomatic organiza- tion than the United States,” Hughes said. “This is not simply a matter of national pride; it is a matter of national security.” Hughes’ guiding principle was the importance of merit-based personnel decisions. Just as, while governor of New York, he had refused to appoint Republican Party hacks, as Secretary of State Hughes was determined to select qualified public servants. He frequently called himself “the only politician in the department.” To this end, Hughes derailed some of President Harding’s more egregious political appointments. Once, when Harding insisted on naming someone Hughes opposed, the Secretary coolly replied, “Of course you are at liberty to do so, if that is your deci- sion.” Reluctant to override the judgment of his Secretary of State and risk his resignation, Harding withdrew the nomination. Hughes asked outgoing Under Secretary Norman H. Davis to help him identify the best career officers for important posts, and he filled the under secretary position—then the second- ranking position in the department—with a succession of skilled career diplomats, including Joseph C. Grew, who served in the same position again at the end of World War II. Hughes also reorganized the department along geographic lines and appointed regional specialists to lead these divisions. Most importantly, Hughes championed the reforms devel- oped by Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr, a career FSO who proposed merging the diplomatic and consular services. In 1919, Massachusetts Representative John Jacob Rogers had introduced Carr’s reform bill, but it languished in Congress. Hughes’ personal papers at the Library of Congress reveal his efforts to enlist Harding to win the support of key senators. In congressional testimony Hughes presented a compelling argu- ment for the reform of a system that barred all but the wealthy from pursuing a diplomatic career. “It is entirely opposed to the traditions of this country, at least to the traditions which we profess to be desirous of maintaining,” Hughes testified, “to have a service which must of necessity, be largely recruited, if not altogether recruited, from those of independent means.” The Rogers Act passed on May 24, 1924. The legislation estab- lished the Foreign Service as we know it today: It merged the diplomatic and consular branches of the State Department, set a uniform pay scale, and eliminated the need for private incomes, “His is the best mind in Washington,” wrote a journalist in a survey of Washington personalities after WorldWar I, “to this everyone agrees.”