The Foreign Service Journal, November 2015

64 NOVEMBER 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL granted representation allowances for diplo- mats, and extended retirement benefits. By professionalizing the State Department, the Rogers Act opened the possibility of diplo- matic service to a broader range of Ameri- cans, not just the independently rich. Congress and the Press Despite the view of Hughes as a whis- kered iceberg, he engaged legislators in highly effective ways. As part of his strat- egy for the naval conference, for instance, Hughes persuaded President Harding to appoint Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Oscar Underwood (D-Ala.), the Senate minority leader, to the U.S. delegation. This avoided Woodrow Wil- son’s mistake of excluding Congress from the Paris Peace Conference deliberations. Only one senator voted against the naval treaty. In 1922 the Senate introduced a bill to unilaterally settle Ger- many’s World War I reparations payments to the United States using German assets seized during the war. American prefer- ences for high tariffs, which Hughes supported, contributed to Berlin’s repayment problems. (This was one of the few black marks on his record.) Nevertheless, he vehemently objected to the proposed legislation as contrary to international norms and suggested instead creating a special commission to negotiate repayment with Germany. Even though establishment of such a commission did not require Senate consultation, Hughes met with Senator William E. Borah (R-Idaho), a leading isolationist voice in Congress, to explain his plan, and carefully laid out the legal precedents. Borah was convinced, and Congress did not pursue the heavy- handed reparations legislation. As a result, the commission reached a satisfactory agreement with Berlin. And so it went throughout his tenure as Secretary of State. Hughes’ willingness to consult and inform Congress was a key to his success. By one estimate, the Senate approved all but two of the 69 treaties submitted during Hughes’ tenure. Another break from the pattern of the Wilson administration was Hughes’ handling of the Washington press corps, which had become a demanding, professionalized force crucial to win- ning—or losing—public opinion. Whereas President Wilson and his Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, alienated journalists with their disdain and misleading statements, and often worked at cross purposes with each other in their pronouncements, Hughes “was the most satisfactory source of interna- tional news in the government in our time,” wrote Fred Essary, a Baltimore Sun reporter who had been a fervent supporter of Wilson. Hughes met twice a day with journal- ists. He was candid and clear. After Harding misstated an aspect of the Washington Naval Conference negotiations, Hughes tasked one of his assistants to make a verbatim report of all foreign policy statements at White House press briefings to ensure the administration spoke with one voice. A True Statesman Whether he was championing state regulation of public services as governor of New York, or pressing unsuccessfully for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice as Secretary of State, Hughes believed progress could be achieved incrementally. He supported the gradual evolution of international behav- ior toward “greater rationality and order.” He was skeptical of attempts to outlaw war, considering armed conflict an unavoid- able condition of international relations. Yet he believed war could be limited through the development of international laws and institutions to arbitrate disputes. In his finest moment at the Washington Naval Conference, Hughes made a realistic assess- ment of what was possible under the circumstances and jetti- soned unworkable provisions—such as the inclusion of auxiliary naval craft—to achieve a limited agreement. Arthur Balfour, the highly respected British delegate to that conference, called Hughes “the most dominating figure I have ever met in public life.” The lessons of his statesmanship still resonate nearly a century later. Back in the 1920s, like today, the United States faced ques- tions about its proper role in an evolving international system. Secretary of State Hughes effectively managed the president, Congress and public opinion to find common ground on chal- lenging foreign policy questions. He seized opportunities to shape a new world to America’s advantage, but he understood progress would take years if not decades. Hughes was unusual not only because he was capable of decisive action, but also because he had the judgment, patience and wisdom to know when U.S. leadership could make a difference. n E. CHICKERING AND CO. OF BOSTON/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS Charles Evans Hughes, 1908.