The Foreign Service Journal, November 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | NOVEMBER 2019 13 W e all owe The Foreign Service Journal a vote of thanks for the series of articles printed in the September issue on preventive diplomacy—a timely reminder of practices we need to reinvigorate. Ironically, after the collapse of the USSR, the United States squandered the peace dividend. Of course we needed to maintain traditional military strength, but after the shock of 9/11, the U.S. government doubled down on military operations combined with covert intel- ligence collection and black operations. To make matters worse, out of under- standable security concerns we decided to limit the role of diplomats overseas. Ambassador Anne Patterson powerfully described the impact of these trends on the health of the international system. Soon after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, three of us at the Foreign Service Institute wrote an article, “An Ounce of Prevention, ” that appeared in the November 2001 Journal . You can find it in the FSJ Archive. Before 9/11 we were adding layers of leadership training at FSI for all cones. Inside the Political Training Division we were providing more courses on science, human rights, negotiations and working with intelligence and law enforcement agencies, while making greater use of case studies and simulations. Together with the Special Studies Division and the Senior Seminar, we worked increasingly with CIA experts, academics, think-tanks and major corpo- rations, in addition to the U.S. Institute of Peace and U.S. Agency for International Development. Our goal was to promote forward thinking and prevention, rather than just better crisis response. Not surprisingly, though they are still the central actors at the State Department, regional bureaus didn’t have much time for training. Our successful multilateral response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 gave hope that we could work with old and new allies and the United Nations to craft, implement and support peacekeeping where needed without Soviet vetoes. Even then, it was marginally easier to respond to “small conflicts” once some blood had been shed than to actually prevent them. We were content to manage and partly fund peacekeeping missions. But given our post-Vietnam fears, we were wary of commitments exposing our regular forces. Then, after the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” tragedy in Somalia and a flawed peacekeeping plan that contributed to genocide in Rwanda the following year, we became even more risk averse. The September FSJ well explains these developments and the total lack of consensus or confidence within the U.S. foreign policy establishment on the use of international peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy. In the midst of these doubts, we were hit on Sept. 11, 2001, by passenger planes turned into terrorist bombs. At FSI we heard and watched one of the planes over- fly Arlington as it targeted the Pentagon. We no longer felt safe behind our two oceans and our friendly borders with Give Prevention a Chance BY ROBERT HOPPER teams for diplomatic initiatives emanating from the White House. These were not mere feel-good, hand-shaking exercises. Rooted in American values and actions, they were aimed at changing percep- tions and attitudes among elites toward the United States. They were also aimed at larger audiences and at preventing disinformation and propaganda from third countries from curdling our relations with allies and newly independent nations. Exchanges of American and foreign students and professors through Fulbright and other academic programs expanded the range of interaction between Ameri- can diplomats and host-country indi- viduals and organizations. Over decades the alumni of these programs developed worldwide organizations that still flourish today. Many Fulbright scholars returned home to become national leaders in their own countries. Likewise, a large number of partici- pants in the International Visitor Leader- ship Program later became heads of gov- ernment, heads of state, foreign ministers and leaders in their societies. They carried with them their American experiences. They established lasting relations and have built strong networks of trust and knowledge with American counterparts that have advanced our national interests over many decades. They became part of our preventive diplomacy and messengers in their societ- ies of what our country, our values and our institutions mean to the world. These are examples not merely of “public diplomacy” but of a much broader diplomacy that has stood the test of time. They deserve to be strengthened and expanded. Retired FSO Bruce K. Byers joined the U.S. In- formation Agency in 1971. He served in South Asia, Europe and East Asia, retiring in 2000.