The Foreign Service Journal, November 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | NOVEMBER 2020 73 Comprehensive strategies— and contingency plans if they fail—are needed urgently to deal with the complex and rapidly deteriorating situation in the Sahel. BY MARK WENT L I NG Mark Wentling retired in 1996 from the Senior For- eign Service after serving as USAID’s principal officer in six African countries. He has worked in Africa for the Peace Corps, nongovernmental organiza- tions and as a contract employee for USAID. He has published five books, and the first of his three-volume Africa Memoir was released in August (see p. 41) . Much of this article is based on that memoir, which covers all 54 African countries. T he deteriorating security situation in West Africa’s vast Sahel region defies any simple description. Its complexity is exacerbated by numerous extremist groups, which seek through violent means to achieve their selfish and inscrutable objectives. Recent acts of violence by members of these groups serve as an urgent call to national gov- ernments and the international community to take additional steps to counter the groups, and protect vulnerable communities from the worst consequences of the increased instabil- ity brought about by mounting violence across the Sahel. Of special concern are three Sahelian countries: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (Central Sahel). Since the military’s overthrow of an elected government in Mali in 2012 and the substantial outflow of arms and extremist fighters following the downfall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya 2011, the level of instability and violence in the Sahel—and the number of incidents in these countries, in particular—has skyrocketed. The military coup in Mali on Aug. 18 further destabilized a country that was once viewed as a model of democracy. There are also reports that the COVID-19 pandemic is playing into the hands of extremist groups, which are willing to take higher risks. It is feared that following historic seasonal rainfall in 2020 in the region these groups will become more aggressive. Recent armed attacks on national military forces by extremist groups in these countries have resulted in extrajudicial killings of nearly 200 people this year by host-country militaries, and retal- iatory attacks on the part of local militia have added to this num- ber. These attacks have fomented intercommunal resentments and led to violence between ethnic groups. One example is the extrajudicial killing of 43 members of the Peulh ethnic group in Burkina Faso in March reported by Amnesty International. Also, corrupt activities by national military forces are not helpful. In this regard, the $100 million military procurement scandal revealed by an official audit in Niger in 2020 is lamentable. The growing waves of violent extremism have introduced drug trafficking, corruption and criminality; collapsed local economies; undermined local and regional institutions and gov- ernance; exacerbated ethnic divisions; and prompted extensive displacement and migration. Without renewed engagement by the international community and a reasoned strategy to take on and defeat extremist violence, this scourge threatens to shatter the centuries-old traditions and social fabric of Sahelian society and could spread to envelop the entirety of West Africa. On the Ground UNHCR reports that the number of people internally displaced in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger increased from nearly 300,000 in 2018 to almost two million by mid-2020. Burkina Faso has especially been hammered by the upsurge in violent extremist activity in 2019 and 2020; the number of people fleeing their homes doubled from nearly 500,000 to a million in less than a year. Large swaths of this country have almost ceased functioning, including the closing of hundreds of schools. All signs indicate that the number of homeless people will continue to grow, a somber indicator of the depth and extent of the con- flict in the Central Sahel. In Niger’s case, the prolonged upheaval in the Lake Chad Basin in the southeast corner of the country has been caused by Boko Haram, which has its base in northeast Nigeria. This group is reported to have caused more deaths than any other terrorist group in the world. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Global Conflict Tracker reports that Boko Haram is responsible for nearly 40,000 deaths since 2011, and the killing continues. The conflict in this area has been exacerbated by the decline in livelihoods caused by the drying up of Lake Chad. Cross-bor- der incursions of Boko Haram insurgents from their bases inside Nigeria have also obliged tens of thousands of local people to flee their homes. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, more than 2.5 million people have been displaced by the vio- lence instigated by Boko Haram, and more than 240,000 people have taken refuge in neighboring countries (mostly Niger).