The Foreign Service Journal, November 2020

74 NOVEMBER 2020 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Perhaps the saddest case in the Central Sahel is Mali because formerly it was so full of promise. Of all the countries in the region, it has the most potential to achieve a higher level of prosperity for its people. Tapping this potential has been thrown off track for more than eight years, and with the recent military coup, it is now unlikely that Mali will ever achieve its full status as a democratic and economically prosperous country. In many ways, violent extremist groups have nixed Mali’s hopes for a better future, and the overthrow of a democratically elected president adds to Mali’s woes. Simultaneously, the bloody acts of extremist groups have unleashed an unprecedented level of criminality and deepened traditional ethnic and communal cleavages. The growth and spread of extremists are aided by decades of weak governance and development failures. The groups thrive in the vast open geographic spaces of the Sahel, which have always been poorly governed or never had any governance at all. The failure of national governments to provide security and social services underlies the multiple grievances of the local population, and these can easily be exploited by extremists. Also in this chaotic mix is the steady stream of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers from other African countries seeking refuge in Niger or a way farther north to desired destina- tions in Europe. The trafficking of migrants, drugs, arms and commercial merchandise continues to make northern Niger a crossroads for lucrative but illegal trade deals. Lately, the level of lawlessness in far northern Niger has been complicated by the discovery of gold in the remote Djado Plateau. The ensuing gold rush, fueled by the rise in international gold prices, has resulted in the influx of thousands of artisanal miners. Most people in the Sahel wish to escape the clutches of abso- lute poverty, but the prospects of doing so are less than before. Living on the edge of survival has always been a challenge in the Sahel. Now, economic decline caused by increased insecu- rity and the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic is making the survival of even the most resilient inhabitants more difficult. And there is little, if any, hope in sight for any improvement in their precarious condition. Factors to Consider There are several important factors to be considered when analyzing the origin and growth of violent extremism in the Sahel and developing a strategy to stop it. For instance, the recession of Lake Chad is a reminder of how climate change, recurrent droughts and exceptional flooding can have profound effects. Most people living in the Sahel depend on agriculture or livestock-raising for their livelihoods, which are threatened by climate change, particularly increasingly variable seasonal rainfall. Climate change thus contributes to increased jobless- ness, which is a destabilizing factor of deep concern. Further, a rapid population growth rate and a youthful population structure (on the average, one-half of the popula- tion is about 15 years old or younger) complicate a progressive erosion of livelihoods. Fast urbanization is also a demographic feature that sets off some alarm bells. Underlying the worrisome demographics of the Sahel is a relatively high and unsustain- able total fertility rate. The current and projected demographic landscape contributes heavily to the deep poverty of the region and its fragility. One commonly voiced fear is that a large number of disaf- fected and unemployed youth will be attracted to violent extremist groups, thus becoming tomorrow’s foot soldiers for these groups. Large portions of the population who have never benefited from their respective national governments and those who view their government officials as corrupt elitists might also be easily swayed by what the extremists have to offer. In some areas of the Central Sahel, rising population densi- ties on less fertile land and overgrazed pastures are causing an increasing number of clashes between farmers and herders. The increase in the numbers of people and animals on the land force people to farm or graze more marginal lands, thus accel- erating the negative effects of desertification and deforestation. Growing competition over increasingly scarce natural and water resources inevitably leads to conflicts. Often, these conflicts are split along contrasting ethnic lines, making it easier for exploitation by violent extremist groups. These kinds of conflict can result in the creation of new armed groups that espouse ideologies designed to stimulate greater intercommunal conflict. And sometimes, extremist groups fight among themselves for supremacy, adding to the multiple layers of mistrust and mayhem. Developing a Strategy All-encompassing short-term and long-term strategies— and contingency plans if they fail—are needed urgently to The growth and spread of extremists are aided by decades of weak governance and development failures.