The Foreign Service Journal, November 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | NOVEMBER 2020 75 deal with this situation. Yet any strategy must take account of certain realities. First is the capacity of the host government to play the role nec- essary to stem the rising tide of violent extremism. Unlike extremist groups in theMiddle East, extremist organizations in the Sahel do not appear to aim to overthrow national governments, but instead seek to undermine themby corrupting or killing individual officials who put their own interests ahead of what is best for their country. We need to understand: What do the extremists have to offer, and what is their ultimate purpose? What do they want? If the host government is unwilling or unable in any way to take the necessary steps, activities designed to shore it up in a durable fashion need to be undertaken, and external support needs to be provided until host-country institutions are certified fully capable of executing key tasks independently. Second, any strategymust include achieving peace and stability in Libya.The United States and its European allies need to flesh out a shared policy that solidly supports the United Nations’ effort to end Libya’s long civil war and stop the interference of foreign pow- ers so that Libya can develop a strong unified government. Peace in Libya is essential to achieving lasting stability in the Sahel. Libya became the trigger for increased violence south of the Sahara with the sudden demise of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, which opened the floodgates for widespread extremist mayhem farther south. It appears that no thought was given to the havoc his removal would cause in this fragile part of Africa. Today, the porosity of Libya’s southern borders make stopping the illicit flow of arms and fighters into the Sahel impossible. Moreover, powerful vested interests in the lucrative cross-border trade will work to maintain the present chaotic situation. Third, though the various extremist groups claim to be moti- vated by a religious zeal generated by their interpretation of Islam, this is in my viewmore a cover for their criminal acts than any true religious conviction. Therefore, I refrain from calling violent extremist actors “jihadists” because I do not see them acting from any deep-seated religious conviction. Their main interests appear to be in the domain of plunder and power. The United States, other members of the international community and regional bodies need to encourage and protect religious Islamic leaders who speak out against the destructive acts of extremist groups. Any radical Islamic preaching that promotes violence should be prohibited by the highest and most respected Islamic authorities. It remains to be seen whether the international community will care enough during these challenging times about the troubles facing the Sahel to do as much as it can to obliterate the extremists and the conditions of poverty and weak gover- nance they prey on. If not, the continued destructive impact of violent extremism will permanently change the face of the Sahel and, perhaps, West Africa as a whole. The Sahel region may very well be yet another casualty of the resource short- ages caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Commitment Needed to Reverse the Trend Centuries-old traditions and the social fabric that previ- ously held Sahelian society together are bound to disintegrate. The longer the Sahelian conflict continues, the more likely that a younger generation will have never known a different life. A protracted conflict may cause a permanent cultural shift of unanticipated proportions. Certainly, the large gap between the outlooks of younger and older people will grow much wider. The recent upsurge in bloody interethnic conflicts indicates that the trend in the Sahel will be difficult to reverse in the short term and will likely spread to other West African countries. Even with a viable strategy and committed resources, it could take a generation or more to stop the spread of violent extremism in the region. Meanwhile, the killing, destruction and displace- ment of tens of thousands more people will continue, aggravat- ing the fragile conditions of these impoverished countries on the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. Moreover, the upheaval in Central Sahel may well spill over into countries located farther south. It is logical to think that once extremists have gained a solid foothold in the Sahelian countries, they will expand their negative presence in coastal West African countries. What is there to stop their movement into Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Togo? While the crisis in the Central Sahel has been consuming large amounts of humanitarian funding from national and international relief organizations, there is no doubt that more aid is needed. Past assistance has not been wasted, but future assistance should be provided as part of an overarching strategy that includes all elements—humanitarian, economic, diplo- matic and military—necessary for the stabilization of the Sahel. The costs of caring for the more than one million refugees and displaced persons and the cost of foreign military assis- tance to combat extremist groups are substantial. Yet more will be needed, along with an unfailing long-term commitment by all concerned, if there is to be any hope of halting and repair- ing the damage done by the spread of violent extremism in the Sahel. There is no room for “business as usual” when dealing with such a protracted, multifaceted and rapidly deepening crisis. n