The Foreign Service Journal, November 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | NOVEMBER 2021 29 Latin America and Africa make the leap into modernity. “The gap between the developed and underdeveloped worlds,” Kennedy argued, was a “challenge to which we have responded most spo- radically, most timidly, and most inadequately.” Once elected, Kennedy quickly turned to plans to overhaul the foreign assistance program. In his first meeting with the National Security Council in 1961, he directed the Bureau of the Budget to develop recommendations on foreign aid, and this effort was combined with the work of a task force already devel- oping recommendations for the president that included Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs George Ball, Budget Director David Bell and Henry Labouisse (who was in charge of much of the existing aid program at the time). Kennedy was also deeply influenced by the thinking of two MIT academics who were making a splash with new theories on foreign assistance: Walt Rostow and Max Millikan. Their prime recommendation: “The United States should launch at the earliest possible moment a long-term program for sustained eco- nomic growth in the free world.” Rostow and Millikan’s notion of directing assistance based on economic prospects rather than on geostrategic priorities was radical for the time. Reorganizing Foreign Assistance George Ball delivered his memo on reorganizing foreign assistance to the president on March 4, 1961. The working group was in clear agreement that almost all foreign aid functions should be housed within a single new government agency, and that instead of a series of disconnected projects, development strategies should approach the challenges in recipient countries holistically. They felt that the new agency had to be field-driven, carry- ing out its responsibilities through the establishment of country “missions” staffed by a mix of U.S. and local personnel. Ken- nedy’s advisers further argued that the new agency should direct programs on a multiyear basis, which would permit developing countries, as David Bell put it, “to undertake the kind of difficult political measures, such as raising taxes or accomplishing a land reform program, which needed to be undertaken.” There was also general concurrence that international eco- nomic assistance should be divorced frommilitary aid and that aid should not be conditioned on support for U.S. policies. As Arthur Schlesinger recalled Kennedy arguing, “If we under- take this effort in the wrong spirit, or for the wrong reasons, or in the wrong way, then any and all financial measures will be in vain.” Major disagreements remained, however, including on the issue of food aid. Food aid, which shipped American food surpluses overseas for use in foreign aid programs, was very important to U.S. farmers at the time. In 1956 food aid purchases by the U.S. government accounted for 27 percent of all wheat exports—a huge market share. Kennedy and others were starting to see the central goal of food aid as addressing global hunger, rather than just dumping America’s surpluses. They wanted to give the new agency control Once elected, Kennedy quickly turned to plans to overhaul the foreign assistance program. A Nigerien man receives a vaccination by way of a Ped-O-Jet jet injector. This image was captured in Niger in 1969, during the worldwide Smallpox Eradication and Measles Control Program. CENTERSFORDISEASECONTROLANDPREVENTION